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Abstract 
This paper considers the use of online public policy engagement as a potential 
tool for political parties to create sustainable competitive advantage.  The analysis draws 
on business strategy frameworks to review how online policy engagement would affect 
party operations, supply chains and brand attitudes.  Key issues considered include 
whether public servants or party employees should run the project; how parties can use 
the data provided by participants to acquire competitive advantages; and a discussion on 
potential project risks, process design and project costs. 
 
Keywords:  online public policy engagement; social media; social networks; participatory 
democracy.  
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Executive Summary 
Political parties are interesting entities.  While many people choose not to become 
involved in politics, or even to vote in democratic elections, major parties rely on public 
support.  As such, many parties are using social media to engage voters.  Once engaged, 
organizers can attempt to turn online followers into supporters, volunteers and donors.   
Pammett and LeDuc (2003) observed that Canadians are “less likely to cast a 
ballot if they feel they have no influence over government actions.”  Offering voters ways 
to engage with political parties may encourage more British Columbians to become 
involved in the democratic process.   
One way to engage the public would be to use online media to solicit the public’s 
views on public policy.  Such an Online Public Policy Engagement Project (OPPEP) could 
provide several benefits to politicians.  We might infer from Pammett and Leduc’s (2003) 
work that voters who see a party that is listening to their views and implementing 
solutions based on public feedback are more likely to support that party and engage in 
the democratic process.  An OPPEP may also draw support for the party from young 
adults, a segment of voters that is more likely to use social networks (Statistics Canada, 
2010) but less likely to vote (Burgar & Monkman, 2010).  This would have long-term 
benefits for parties that can capture younger voters, since most voters choose the same 
party in subsequent elections (Shachar, 2003).  Lastly, parties may be able to recruit 
some of the participants to become volunteers during election campaigns, increasing the 
likelihood that the party will succeed in future elections. 
Governing parties must recognize that they will someday return to opposition.  
Therefore, they should resist the temptation to have government employees manage the 
project.  This would hand a fully functional OPPEP over to a rival when the party loses 
control of government.  Further, using government resources to run the project would 
prevent parties from asking participants to volunteer for partisan activities.   
While social media celebrates the ability of everyone to publish opinions, this can 
pose a risk for parties.  Politics evokes strong emotions and a few people react 
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inappropriately during disagreements, potentially driving away some participants.  Open 
forums also provide an opportunity for special interest groups to hijack the project 
(Macnamara, Bamford & Betts, 2010) and promote a view not endorsed by the majority.   
Evans (2010, p. 17) noted that, “one of the biggest misnomers… is that marketing 
in the online medium is easy, quick, and cheap.”  This project is not without trade-offs.  
Once a party is paying more attention to the public, it may not be able to lend as much 
support to the views of cooperating special interest groups.  This is important because 
those groups can bring resources to the election campaign.  Cost is another trade-off, 
since even a modest effort to set up and run an OPPEP would cost approximately 
$200,000 per year.  Once participants provide suggestions, parties must invest resources 
to analyse and act on the comments because, as the OECD (2003) notes, participants 
have a legitimate expectation that leaders will use the feedback provided.  It might take a 
single staff person approximately two weeks to complete all of the work required to ask a 
question and to follow up on the comments received.   
Once the project is running, the party could draw participants into the party fold.  
Managers will learn what topics interest each participant and could develop individualized 
marketing materials.  Organizers could ask participants to volunteer for the party, a 
request they may be more likely to accept once they have taken part in the OPPEP.  
Organizers will only be able to ask participants to volunteer if the party runs the project.  
Parties cannot use OPPEPs to recruit volunteers if public funds support the project. 
Engagement offers a way to find people who are interested in politics and invite 
them to become involved with a political party.  It is also a way to get participants’ 
permission to market to them.  This permission could increase the effectiveness of 
marketing efforts.  The many benefits of engaging the public in government policy 
suggest that party leaders should incorporate such efforts into their online marketing 
strategies.   
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Glossary 
BDN This acronym stands for Benefits Dependency Network. 
Benefits 
Dependency 
Network 
A cause-effect network map linking tools, business processes and 
project benefits.  This map also assigns responsibility for delivering 
each item to individual managers (Peppard, Ward & Daniel, 2007).     
Caucus This refers to both the set of MLAs elected from a single party and 
to the staff organization supporting the caucus. 
Citizens’ 
Assembly on 
Electoral 
Reform 
A group of randomly selected voters empowered to recommend 
options for a new electoral system.  The recommended option was 
defeated in two separate referenda (Citizens' Assembly on 
Electoral Reform, n.d.). 
Conversation 
on Health 
A large-scale public consultation initiated by Government in 2006 at 
a cost of $10 million (Mickleburgh, 2006).  The goal was to identify 
ways to ensure the public health system would remain sustainable. 
Critic An opposition MLA designated as party spokesperson for a file. 
Earned Media Any media coverage not paid for by the focal entity.  Earned media 
include news stories, letters to the editor and editorial columns.  
Marketers refer to this as publicity. 
e-Democracy This is the use of online communication technology in political 
processes to communicate with voters. 
Friend Finder 
Tools 
Social networking tools that suggest accounts the user might be 
interested in following. 
Interest Groups This term refers to special interest groups. 
Issue Groups This term is used to refer to special interest groups. 
MLA Member of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly 
Open Platform A project inviting members of the public to submit ideas that party 
leaders might consider for inclusion in the campaign platform. 
  xiii 
OPPEP This acronym stands for Online Public Policy Engagement Project. 
Organizer An organizer is either a paid or a volunteer political worker who 
arranges people or projects. 
Party This is short for political party. 
Push Strategy This term refers to any media effort attempting to push content out 
to consumers. 
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1: Introduction 
"[I]t is a contradiction in terms: you can be open or you can have government." 
Sir Arnold, fictional Cabinet Secretary 
BBC Series “Yes Minister” – Open Government 
 
The above quote, from the sitcom Yes Minister, highlights an attitude that many 
people perceive their governing parties to hold.  This perception leaves many people 
feeling voiceless in decisions affecting their daily lives. It also reduces public support for 
political parties and even the likelihood that an individual will vote (Pammett and LeDuc, 
2003).  Political parties may be able to change this by inviting people into the decision 
making process.   
Prior to the advent of electronic social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, it 
could be a difficult and expensive task to hold consultations about potential policy 
changes.  Consultations often meant hearings and town hall meetings would be set up 
across B.C. in order to study how the suggested policy changes would affect different 
regions.  The province budgeted $10 million to run one particularly large consultation 
(Mickleburgh, 2006).  Most consultations cost less, but the price of running them can 
lead decision makers to conduct more informal, cheaper surveys, such as simply getting 
feedback from a few knowledgeable individuals.  This approach can improve the quality 
of public policy but may leave the average citizen feeling that they have had no say. 
Social networks, a form of social media, are providing inexpensive ways to 
consult voters.  One need no longer visit a community to get feedback from local 
residents.  Personal interaction can take place online.  This is pushing politicians across 
the world to consider how they can use social networks to interact with constituents.     
Inviting public participation in decision-making provides benefits to parties over 
and above simply improving the popularity of their platforms.  Parties must attract 
members to earn the donations, volunteer labour and votes needed for success.  
Involving the public in policy development has the potential to improve performance on 
all three measures.  As people spend more time online, properly designed social media 
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strategies may improve the odds of electoral success.  “Customers have become 
increasingly suspicious of… online marketing.”  (Evans, 2010, p. 19)  Asking for input 
may provide a way to navigate around that suspicion, by earning the trust of engaged 
citizens along with the permission of participants to market the party to them. 
Parties using social media might attract younger voters.  Younger Canadians are 
more likely to use social networks (Statistics Canada, 2010) but are less likely to vote 
(Menard, 2010).  Burgar and Monkman (2010) note that British Columbians aged 20-24 
are only 34% likely to cast a ballot.  Once people vote for a party, they are very likely to 
make the same choice in the next election (Shachar, 2003), which makes gaining the 
votes of young people a long-term advantage for politicians.   
Chapter 2 will explore political competition through a business strategy lens to 
identify success factors that will help to compare different ways to open up an online 
policy forum.  This chapter will also review voter behaviour, along with the social and 
technological changes affecting politics. 
A number of agencies could manage the project on behalf of a party.  I will 
explore which agency should run the project in Chapter 3.  This chapter will also look at 
whether to open the project up to the public or limit participation to invited guests, 
whether to display feedback and which platforms organizers should use to host the 
project.  Part of the discussion in this chapter will also review how some parties are 
currently using social media at home and around the world. 
Before discussing the detailed design choices required to implement the project, I 
will review potential risks and mitigation strategies in Chapter 4.  Awareness of these 
risks will allow organizers to avoid or minimize potential consequences. 
Chapter 5 will explore detailed OPPEP design choices.  It will look at traditional 
consultation processes, to inform the design of the project.  The chapter will finish with a 
discussion of the next steps that organizers can take to use project data to market the 
party to participants.   
Ultimately, parties must recognize that the project is resource intensive, thus 
limiting the number of consultations that can be carried out.  Therefore, these projects 
could only provide occasional engagements and should not be a stand-alone social 
media strategy.  The appendix outlines the project costs and underlying assumptions. 
This is a fascinating topic that I look forward to reviewing in detail with the reader. 
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2: Industry Analysis 
Electoral politics is an industry.  Its products are candidates and platforms which, 
as Belch, Belch and Guolla (2005, p. 20) noted, can be marketed to voters.  Employees 
are hired, competitors work to earn voter support and the winners form government or sit 
in opposition.  Competitors use many channels to market themselves.  Parties have to 
manage both brand image and supply chains.  Therefore, it makes sense to use 
business strategy frameworks to review the options that competitors might choose when 
deciding whether to engage citizens through an OPPEP. 
This chapter will define the industry, explore competitive behaviour within politics 
and review success factors.  To do this, I will start by reviewing the supply chain to show 
how parties can create advantages.  I will also explore some technological and social 
changes affecting politics and look at consumer behaviour.  Reviewing these topics will 
develop a clearer understanding of the benefits of holding online policy discussions. 
2.1 Industry Definition 
Developing an industry definition will help to describe the challenges and 
opportunities facing parties.  Since different players exist in each jurisdiction, the 
definition is limited to a specific geography.  The actions of a party in one province may 
not influence public perception in another, and sub-national governments rarely invade 
one another’s turf.  Additionally, each region has different rules and traditions governing 
elections.  For example, some municipalities have entrenched party systems, while 
others lack civic parties.  Some governments subsidize competitors while others do not.  
However, much of the following analysis is transferable to other jurisdictions. 
Special interest groups insert themselves into the process to advocate for the 
views of their members and should be included in the industry definition. 
I will define the industry to be the set of political parties competing to form 
government or to win legislative seats in British Columbia, and the special interest 
groups attempting to influence the result of elections and government decisions. 
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2.2 Supply Chain 
The supply chain 
illustrated in Figure 1 shows 
how a party can combine 
ideas, candidates, 
volunteers and financial 
resources to market its 
product: an option for 
voters to support.  The 
product is both the 
candidates and the policy 
platform.  Understanding 
supply chains will illuminate 
potential sources of 
advantage.  
As shown in Figure 1, managers can combine several inputs to market a party.  
Parties organize large volunteer networks to complete the thousands of tasks that 
parties must carry out during campaigns.  Donors supply the needed financial resources.   
Parties offer policy platforms and candidates to voters.  Each input can help to run a 
successful campaign. 
Organizers use the inputs in Figure 1 to run marketing efforts.  As subsequent 
sections will show, parties can use these inputs and channels to earn public support.  
Figure 2, located on the following page, shows simplified views of frequently performed 
marketing tasks that parties perform.  I will discuss these processes in further detail 
throughout this chapter.  
  
Figure 1 - Industry supply chain 
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2.2.1 Supply Chain Inputs 
As shown in Figure 1 on page 4, parties use many inputs to arrive at the desired 
outputs of winning legislative seats and earning influence over public policy.  Inputs 
include volunteers, donations, elected officials, candidates, policies, market research 
and communication strategies.  Organizers use these inputs to operate campaign efforts 
that may convince a voter to mark an x beside the desired name.  While some of these 
inputs depend in part on the others, they are also all somewhat independent.  I will 
describe these inputs in sections 2.2.1.1 – 2.2.1.7 below and show how each influences 
a target audience – the voter.1  Understanding the inputs will highlight how OPPEPs 
could affect each resource and how each resource can be used to influence potential 
voters. 
2.2.1.1 Volunteers 
Sayers (1998, p. 67) noted that, “campaign teams must be large enough to fulfil 
the labour-intensive activities of a campaign.”  A dozen or more volunteers may be 
required in each riding every day during a campaign to carry out the tasks that lead to 
                                                     
1
 Other potential target audiences exist such as journalists, cooperating special interest groups and donors.  
These other potential targets will be discussed as needed throughout this paper.  However, this analysis 
primarily focuses on how OPPEPs would influence voters since it is ultimately their choices that 
determine whether a party succeeds. 
2
 With the exception, as noted by Sayers (1998), of the few core workers who manage the campaign.   
3
 The act allows parties to spend $4.4 million provincially plus $70,000 in each riding, indexed to inflation.   
4
 The reader may note that some lobbyists may ‘volunteer’ in expectation of future rewards.  Sayers (1998) 
Figure 2 - The marketing processes of political parties 
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victory (at least that is the case in ridings actively contested by the party).  These jobs 
range from putting up signs, to knocking on doors, to running the local office.  A riding 
cannot rely on the same workers every day, since most people have limited time to 
volunteer.2  On voting day, managers may require more than 100 workers per riding to 
scrutineer at polling stations. 
Volunteers are important for many of the marketing efforts that parties use to 
communicate with voters.  They put up signs, phone into radio shows, draft letters to the 
editor, knock on doors and contact voters.  These functions can help to win elections.  
For example, Nickerson (2005) showed that partisan phone banking could increase voter 
turnout by over 3%.  This can be an advantage if parties contact their supporters. 
Many jurisdictions impose campaign-spending limits, thus affecting the ability of 
parties to substitute paid labour for volunteers.  Sections 198 - 201 of B.C.’s Election Act 
(1996) limit a party’s province-wide spending to $10 million during provincial general 
elections.3  From this amount, each party must purchase advertising, rent office space, 
pay for their leader’s campaign tour, rent computers and software and print brochures.  
This leaves little room in the budget to pay for many workers.  Therefore, while some 
workers are paid, parties can only hire a fraction of the needed campaign staffers.  As 
with any organization, employees must be motivated to work, but organizers must use 
non-monetary incentives to motivate unpaid workers. 
Unger (1991, p. 72) reports that the research of Mueller and others shows that in 
general “…volunteers are ‘paid’ for their work in four ways: the family unit consumes the 
collective good, the volunteer enjoys a ‘selective incentive’…, the family’s human capital 
is improved, or an altruistic motivation is served.”  Butler and Collins (1994) state that 
many volunteers are motivated by proximity to power and the ability to contribute to a 
meaningful cause.4  OPPEPs could enable volunteers feel closer to power.  Policy 
engagement may also help potential volunteers to feel like they are contributing to an 
important cause when they see the party act on the input received through the OPPEP. 
                                                     
2
 With the exception, as noted by Sayers (1998), of the few core workers who manage the campaign.   
3
 The act allows parties to spend $4.4 million provincially plus $70,000 in each riding, indexed to inflation.   
4
 The reader may note that some lobbyists may ‘volunteer’ in expectation of future rewards.  Sayers (1998) 
notes that each of the 85 local campaigns needs a large number of volunteers  As of writing this paper, 
B.C.’s Lobbyist registry only shows 514 registered consultant lobbyists in the previous year, not enough 
to fill the several thousand jobs required on election day.  Further, not all lobbyists volunteer for their 
lobbying targets.  For example, Premier Christy Clark’s most recent by-election opponent has declared 
that he is lobbying her on several issues (Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists for British Columbia, n.d.). 
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2.2.1.2 Donors 
Many parties invest substantial financial resources to win elections.  Organizers 
spend funds on advertising, office space and all the materials needed to mount a 
credible effort.  Parties use donations to fund a variety of voter communications.  Since 
the B.C. government does not subsidize parties, organizers must solicit donations. 
As Levitt (1994) noted, potential donors are less likely to contribute to candidates 
who have less hope of winning.  Engaging potential donors through online media and 
building brand awareness and positive attitudes through online tools can help to raise 
funds.  Section 2.6.2.4 contains details about the fundraising capabilities of each major 
rival political party. 
2.2.1.3 Elected Politicians 
It is rare for parties to succeed in an election if none of their members were 
elected to the Legislature in the previous election.  In the past 60 years (17 elections), 
only five parties have had members elected to the new Legislature after failing to have 
any of their members elected in the previous campaign.  In two of these instances, the 
successful candidates had all won seats in the previous election under different banners 
(Elections B.C., 2010; Elections B.C., 2005; Legislative Library of B.C., 2002; Elections 
B.C. & Legislative Library of B.C., 1998).  Elections B.C. (n.d., d) listed 28 parties active 
in December 2011, yet despite this number of parties, only two parties elected any 
candidates in the 2009 election. 
Having an elected caucus provides a platform for communicating with the public.  
Representatives can champion causes on behalf of constituents.  News media may 
report on the activities of these representatives and give voice to the ideas they put 
forward.  Tomz and van Houweling noted (2008, p. 304) that “voters choose candidates 
not only on the issues, but also on… competence, trustworthiness, and other factors.”  
Elected politicians who perform their jobs well can build a reputation for competence and 
trustworthiness.   
Engaging citizens is one way to unlock the benefits of having elected politicians.  
Politicians can do this through a variety of forums, including online media.  Working with 
citizens to develop policy can help to build confidence and trust in the political party. 
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2.2.1.4 Candidates 
Successful parties must offer candidates that the public will support.  Parties try 
to attract credible candidates who are prepared to put their lives on hold while they 
expend the significant time and effort required to win.  Sayers (1998, p. 34) noted that it 
is easier for parties to attract candidates when there is a better chance of winning.  Since 
better candidates are more likely to step forward when the party is more electable, 
candidate quality depends partly on the other supply chain inputs  Parties may also train 
their nominated candidates in order to achieve the best possible performance.  OPPEPs 
could help to increase party strength making it easier to attract candidates. 
2.2.1.5 Policy 
Voters wish to elect candidates whose policies they support.  No voter wants to 
cast a ballot for a party only to see government policies adjusted in ways that they 
believe are wrong.  As a result, parties develop policy platforms that they believe will 
attract public support.  They also work to undermine the popularity of rivals’ 
commitments. 
Campaign promises are only an advantage if they are popular enough to improve 
the odds of winning, yet challenging enough to deter rivals from imitating.  An easily 
imitated policy may provide no advantage since rivals can mimic such positions.  Parties 
work to adopt popular positions that rivals cannot imitate without upsetting a portion of 
the opponent’s support.  Such issues, while challenging to identify, can be invaluable on 
voting day.  As an example, tax cuts were popular during the 2001 election (Sullivan, 
2001), but they may have been difficult for the then governing party to support.  That 
party had frequently raised taxes during its term in office, so it is unlikely that voters 
would have believed a promise from the party to cut taxes.  Furthermore, many of that 
party’s supporters might have opposed tax cuts.  This may be why the rival party at the 
election attacked tax cuts, noting that taxes pay for public services (Mickleburgh, 2001). 
The policy platform is part of brand identity.  It may or may not attract people to 
support the cause.  Online engagement can improve the players’ abilities to build 
positive brand identity in potential supporters’ minds.  That is “where the power of the 
brand lies”, according to Keller (1998, p. 595).  Online supporters may also spread 
awareness of the platform’s benefits, expanding the reach of the party’s efforts. 
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2.2.1.6 Polling/Market Research 
Successful strategists often obtain research pointing to what voters actually want 
before drafting policy.  While it is desirable to incorporate the feedback of constituents 
who approach their elected representatives, this introduces selection bias.  Input from 
self-selected individuals may not represent the majority perspective.  Clarke (2010, p. 6) 
notes that social media groups may also contain these biases.  More scientific methods, 
such as polling, can provide better information.  Focus groups can also be used to 
gather ideas about why people react the way they do to various topical issues.  As noted 
by Keller (1998, p. 503), “brands that receive inadequate [research] support… risk 
becoming out-of-date.”  Parties should not risk irrelevance by underinvesting in market 
research. 
Parties demonstrate the importance of market research by the amount of money 
they invest in this activity.  The Liberals invested $280,000 in polling during the 2009 
election year, while the BC NDP spent nearly $324,000 (BC Liberal Party, 2011, a; BC 
NDP, 2010).  OPPEPs cannot replace market research, since Clarke (2010) noted that 
online communities might not represent the broader public.  However, the comments 
may provide insight into how people feel about the party, its policies and its candidates. 
2.2.1.7 Communications/Ad Design 
Communicating through news media can help organizers to achieve their 
marketing objectives, whether through paid advertising or through news coverage.  
Research and creative support can make media communications more effective. 
Research can help to design successful communication strategies.  Politicians do 
not like surprises that undermine their objectives.  A recent example from the NDP’s 
2009 election campaign illustrates this point.  The party used their planned Earth Day 
event to attack government for approving run of the river electric power generation 
projects.  This backfired when reporters determined that the former NDP government 
had approved nearly half of all active run of the river projects (Canadian Press, 2009), a 
fact that may not have been found by the party’s researchers when planning the event5. 
A well-researched announcement will not create problems but neither will it 
                                                     
5
 Alternatively, the fact may have been uncovered by party researchers but discounted during the event 
planning process.  However, this event still shows that acquiring good data and correctly interpreting its 
significance can improve decision making. 
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guarantee coverage.  Without a gripping story, media may look for another topic that is 
more likely to sell advertisements.   Communication specialists may help craft an 
appealing story.     
Research and communications experts can also help design advertisements.  As 
noted by Belch et al. (2005), most people see or hear over 1000 advertisements per day 
but perceive fewer than 100 of them.  Appealing advertisements are more likely to grab 
the attention of viewers and break through the clutter of messages that advertisers 
collectively bombard voters with on a daily basis.   
Designing advertisements does not get them published.  Parties must purchase 
airtime and print space from media outlets.  The NDP spent nearly $2 million on 
advertisements in 2009, while the victorious Liberals invested $429,000, demonstrating 
the importance parties place on this function (BC Liberal Party, 2011, a; BC NDP, 2009). 
OPPEPs can improve the efficacy of advertisements and other communication 
efforts.  Party communications can get people talking.  If they talk with an OPPEP 
participant who supports the party, they may hear a word-of-mouth referral.  Keller 
(1998, p. 103) noted that 40% of people feel that word-of-mouth recommendations are 
most important to choosing a brand. 
2.2.2 Marketing Channels 
Parties employ many marketing channels to communicate with voters, and to 
build support for their political platform.  It is less likely that electors will vote for a party if 
organizers do not build support for its candidates and platform. 
Individual voters use different channels to gather information to inform their 
decisions.  Some base their choice on conversations with friends while others look to 
news media.  Some search social media sources while others get information through a 
newsletter.  A party that is better able to use these channels is more likely to succeed.   
Parties need to communicate with voters using channels that voters listen to if 
they wish to communicate successfully.  While B.C.’s voters may be different from the 
Californians surveyed by Lipsitz, Trost, Grossman and Sides (2006), many voters prefer 
to receive campaign communications through debates, town hall meetings and call-in 
shows.  While the researchers conducted this study before the rise of social networks, 
social media share similar features to the forums identified in the study.  Earned media, 
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or publicity, is important too as Belch et al. (2005, p. 9) noted, “consumers tend to be 
less sceptical toward favourable information” when the source is thought to be unbiased. 
OPPEPs may become a source of information that some voters will use to inform their 
choices at the polling station. 
2.2.2.1 Collaborators 
Special interest groups can pick sides and use their resources to sway voters.  
Interest groups can carry weight with their members and with the public, as Belch et al. 
noted above.  Groups with credibility and long mailing lists can be valuable allies.  Voters 
can choose to take information provided by special interest groups into account before 
making their choice at the polling station.     
Interest groups can buy advertisements on behalf of candidates that they 
support.  For example, the BC Teachers’ Federation spent $1.5 million on pro-NDP 
advertisements during the 2005 election (Fowlie & Rolfson, 2009).   
OPPEPs are unlikely to help relationships with collaborators.  In fact, as a party 
listens more to OPPEP participants, it may have to give less weight to collaborators. 
2.2.2.2 Mainstream News Media 
News media play a significant role in politics.  Reporters lend credibility to 
candidates by reporting on their activities, or make MLAs invisible by ignoring them.  
Journalists frame issues and choose which stories to report.  Unfortunately, Miljan and 
Cooper (2003, p. 172) found “strong evidence that the individual views of journalists do 
influence the way they cover the news” in their study of Canadian journalists.   
A recent poll showed that 32% of Canadians trust journalists (Pearce, 2010).  
This is a sizable portion of the electorate, given that a small portion of the vote can 
decide the winner.  To paraphrase Belch et al.’s 2005 (p. 9) observation, consumers are 
generally less sceptical of positive information about a product received from a source 
perceived to be unbiased.  As a result, parties maintain communications teams to 
present stories that will attract the interest of reporters.  These teams also train 
candidates in how to respond to questions to avoid, or get out of, trouble. 
Policy engagement programs may or may not influence news reporters directly.  
Journalists may or may not choose to take part in an OPPEP.  Some might be cynical, 
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while others are supportive.  As noted above, their views can influence their coverage.  
However, if OPPEPs facilitate better policy development, then fewer media issues may 
arise.  This may lead more journalists to become personally supportive of the party (or at 
least devote less time to highlighting problems). 
2.2.2.3 Social Media 
As with any new medium, many politicians have looked at ways to employ social 
networks.  Unlike mainstream media, social networks allow politicians to reach 
constituents, in a way that is unfiltered by reporters.  However, politicians can only reach 
voters if people are listening.  I will discuss some contemporary political uses of social 
media in section 3.1. 
Clarke (2010) noted that Canadians are increasingly using online sources to 
inform their decisions.  Veenhof and Timusk (2009) found that internet use is increasing 
amongst all age groups and that by 2007 more than 70% of those between the ages of 
15 and 64 used the internet.  Statistics Canada (2010) recently reported that 58% of 
Canadians use social networks, and that this number is skewed toward younger age 
groups as shown in Figure 3.  More Canadians are likely to use online tools in the future 
as younger people age which will increase the potential size of the OPPEP audience.  A 
larger audience would enable an OPPEP to have more impact on the electorate. 
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Figure 3 - Social network use by age group, adapted from Statistics Canada (2010) 
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2.2.2.4 Direct Mail/email 
Lipsitz et al. (2005) noted that very few voters prefer to learn about a political 
campaign through political mail.  Gerber et al. (2003) found that eight pieces of mail 
increased the likelihood of getting someone to vote by 1%.  This margin separated the 
major parties in four ridings during the last election (Elections BC, 2010).  Therefore, 
parties should continue to use this tool in tight races.   
2.2.2.5 Mass Advertising 
It is often not enough to rely on news media to get a message out.  Belch et al. 
(2005, p. 418) note that publicity typically only lasts for a short time.  Candidates who 
want to frame an issue for an extended period might use advertising to ensure that 
voters hear the message often enough for it to really become familiar.  Section 2.2.1.7 
provides a more thorough discussion of the role of advertising in political communication.  
Politicians are now advertising on new media in addition to more traditional formats. 
OPPEPs could increase the impact of advertising.  Advertisements may generate 
conversation, and if voters talk with an OPPEP participant, they may get a word of mouth 
referral that Belch et al. (2005) noted is important to many people’s decision-making 
process. 
2.2.2.6 Direct Contact (Door Knocking, Telephoning, Events and Debates) 
Direct contact can help to swing elections.  In a controlled experiment, Nickerson 
(2005) found that partisan phone banking increases the rate of voting by 3.2%, a margin 
that decided 10 ridings in the 2009 B.C. provincial election (Elections BC, 2010).  Pattie 
and Johnston (2003) found that face-to-face canvassing had a statistically significant 
effect during the 1997 British election.  Therefore, a party can sway the outcome of a 
close election by convincing more supporters to vote in close ridings.  Direct contact can 
also help to identify which party an individual voter supports.   
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As shown in Figure 4, fewer eligible voters are exercising their right to vote.  Just 
half of eligible voters cast ballots in 2009.  Low turnout means that a party can win with 
only minority support, so long as its supporters actually vote. In fact, the NDP could have 
won the last election with only 5,700 more votes, provided each ballot pushed the ten 
closest ridings just over the edge.  This represents only 0.34% of all ballots cast in an 
election the party lost by nearly 4% of all valid votes6 (Elections BC, 2010).  Many parties 
build databases to track support so that they can focus on encouraging supporters to 
come out and vote.7   OPPEPs can help attract the volunteers needed to identify voter 
support and to push voters to the polling station. 
2.2.3 Final Thoughts on the Supply Chain 
The preceding discussion has shown the importance of many inputs and 
marketing channels to the operations of political parties.  This analysis showed that 
some are important while others, such as mail, are relatively ineffective. 
                                                     
6
 A similar event happened in 1996.  The NDP secured 39% of the vote and defeated the Liberals who 
secured 42% support during the election (Legislative Library of BC, 2002). 
7
 While beyond the scope of this paper, some parties have reportedly gone so far as to purchase marketing 
data and developing niche database marketing strategies (Cillizza, 2007).  Others simply use databases to 
track voter contacts so that identified supporters can be encouraged to vote. 
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Figure 4 - B.C. voting rate by provincial election, adapted from Elections BC, Statistics 
and Surveys (n.d., c) 
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Using an OPPEP would have positive or neutral impacts on most of the inputs 
and channels, as shown in Figure 10.  Since OPPEPs may improve relationships with 
volunteers and strengthen public perception of the party’s platform, they represent an 
opportunity to improve links in the supply chain.  The next sections will explore social 
and technological changes, along with voter and competitor behaviour.  Combining 
these items with the supply chain will inform a consequent discussion of sources of 
advantage. 
2.3 Voter Behaviour 
Levine (2005, p. 63) pessimistically noted that, 
“there is little research to help us understand how each 
individual follower decides which leader will receive the 
sought-after vote.”  However, there is still some data 
available to help our understanding of this component 
of electoral politics.  In addition to research on voter 
behaviour, we can use marketing and brand 
management research to derive further insight into 
voter choice. 
Tomz and van Houweling noted (2008, p. 304) 
that “voters choose not only on the issues, but also on 
charisma, competence, trustworthiness...”  Therefore, 
parties should improve public perception of their 
leadership and their perceived ability to manage key 
files.   
   Parties can identify segments of the 
population and develop consistent platforms targeting 
the segments.  Table 1 shows a benefit segmentation 
and Table 2, located on page 16, shows how people 
are likely to vote based on those benefits, if they are 
only voting based on a single issue.  Unfortunately, 
more demographic data about the likely members of each segment are not available 
from the Angus Reid Public Opinion (2012) survey.  However, older voters are more 
likely to care about hospital services (Parliament of Canada, n.d.) while families with 
Table 1 - Voter priorities, adapted 
from Angus Reid 
Public Opinion 
(2012, p. 7) 
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young children may care more than other segments about education.  However, there 
are no hard and fast rules.  For example, a newly retired teacher may vote on education 
issues despite having no children.  These segments shift over time as Chapter 5 will 
show.   
Across 
these market 
segments, there 
are six major 
groups of 
customers or non-
customers facing 
each party: 
members, 
supporters, 
independent 
voters, non-voters 
and supporters 
and members of rival parties.  These segments form a spectrum shown in Figure 5.  
Organizers achieve victory by getting enough members, supporters and independent 
voters to endorse the party so that it can sit in opposition or form government.  Rival 
supporters should not be a big focus since it is hard to persuade them to switch 
(Shachar, 2003).  
 
 
Each party’s goal is to move voters to more supportive segments.  Parties also 
Figure 5 - Basic customer segments 
Table 2 - Relative rankings of party leaders on major issues, adapted from 
Angus Reid Public Opinion (2012, p. 6) 
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work to increase the likelihood that members volunteer for or donate to the party.  Party 
organizers do this by identifying political and policy positions that will achieve the party’s 
goals, preferably positions that rivals cannot imitate without alienating some of their 
supporters.  Figure 6 describes some potential goals that parties might have for each 
segment.  
 
 
Most parties direct resources to identifying supportive constituents and to getting 
them to the polls.  Parties’ efforts to convince opposing voters to change their choices 
are often less fruitful.  As noted by Butler and Collins (1994), a voter’s “first electoral 
choices tend to be enduring.”  Shachar (2003) came to a similar conclusion saying: “In 
most democracies, two out of any three individuals vote for the same party in sequential 
elections”.  Since potential voters are only 50% likely to vote, after developing and 
communicating a platform, parties should direct substantial effort to increasing the 
numbers of their supporters who vote.  OPPEPs can help attract members and convince 
people to become party supporters. 
Fringe parties become problematic if a third party siphons off enough support to 
cost a major party seats.  It is debatable how often this happens.  There were frequent 
allegations, during the 1990s, that the Conservative and Reform parties split votes thus 
handing majorities to the federal Liberals (see for instance Thorsell, 1995).  However, 
voters supporting a third party might have been unwilling to support another party as 
shown in the 2000 and 2004 elections.  During the 2000 federal election, the 
Figure 6 - Possible party goals for each segment 
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Progressive Conservatives and Alliance parties earned a combined 56% of votes cast in 
B.C.  This declined to 36% in 2004 after the parties merged (Elections Canada, 2004; 
Elections Canada, 2001). 
The fact that most voters choose the same party in consecutive elections helps to 
reduce the threat new parties entering the contest.   Strategic voting further limits the 
threat of entry.  As shown by Merolla and Stephenson (2007), up to 15% of Canadians 
vote for their second choices meaning that even if a voter prefers a minor party, they 
may vote for a major party simple because the ballot would have a better chance of 
influencing the election. 
Brand awareness appears to be high among consumers.  Angus Reid (2012, p. 
6) shows that 75% of voters have a definite perception of who would make the best 
premier.  I suspect that many of the remaining 25% of voters are also aware of the major 
party brands.  While it is possible that people are forming opinions without being aware 
of the brand, it is more likely that people formed these perceptions based on their brand 
awareness. 
Keller (1998) suggests that it is important to increase the perceived benefits 
provided by the brand when awareness is high.  When this is the case, Belch et al. 
(2005, p. 124) state that improving perception of salient beliefs is important.  They go on 
to state that many consumers select a brand based on the formula:  
Attitude = ∑ (Beliefi * Importancei) 
where Beliefi is the individual’s belief about the product’s ability to satisfy a voter’s need 
and Importancei is the relative importance of that attribute.  Keller (p. 100) noted that 
brand attitude could form the basis of brand choice.  However, as noted earlier, some 
voters will vote for their second choice, possibly because the ability to win is an attribute 
that factors into their selection. 
2.4 Competitor Behaviour 
Understanding competitor behaviour helps to identify how managers should 
select and frame OPPEP questions.  This section will also describe, at a high level, what 
kind of voter each party attracts and which topics appeal to those voters.  Chapter 5 
discusses topic selection in more detail. 
The previous sections showed how parties can manage supply chains to gain 
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advantages over rivals.  In addition to operating supply chains to manage voter 
identification and persuasion, rivalry in politics involves taking differentiated positions in 
order to appeal to voters.  Parties work to identify and claim popular positions and to 
make their existing positions more popular.  Unlike many other industries, where it is 
possible to operate profitably by identifying and serving a niche, politics requires that 
support be substantial enough to elect representatives.  This often means identifying a 
number of voter segments and the positions that can satisfy each group. 
B.C.’s two main parties adopt two competing platforms to appeal to different 
segments of the voters.  Throughout the rest of this section, I will appropriate Mark 
Wexler’s terminology, from his work Leadership in Context, The Four Faces of 
Capitalism (2005), to describe how the two main B.C. parties position themselves. 
The mission statement of the BC Liberals party proclaims that it is a “free 
enterprise party” and that its first key priority is to “promote private sector job creation 
and competitiveness” (BC Liberals, n.d., b).  The party clarifies this priority by stating that 
it means enhancing rather than impairing the ability of business to create jobs.  This is 
analogous to the entrepreneurial worldview described by Wexler that appeals to voters 
who believe that markets offer the best solutions.  While not wanting to eliminate 
government, adherents of this view prefer that regulation be limited in favour of market 
solutions.  The party has cut government regulations by more than a third, in support of 
this view (Ministry of Finance, 2011).  
Individual choice and market solutions are important to this view.  This platform 
appeals to people who believe that the role of government is to provide essential public 
services but otherwise to stand back and let businesses create jobs and prosperity.  
Allies include many businesses and industry associations.  While the resulting 
distribution of wealth may lead to the creation of both ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, adherents 
believe the system will maximize wealth and ensure that everyone has a chance (at least 
in theory). 
The NDP’s web site states that “social and economic justice [are its] guiding 
principles” (BC NDP, n.d., a).  The party believes government should actively reduce 
inequality, placing the party in Wexler’s regulatory worldview.  Wexler (2005) argues that 
adherents to this worldview do not like the unequal distribution of wealth endorsed by the 
entrepreneurial view.  Party leader Adrian Dix has confirmed his preference for a more 
equitable wealth distribution on a number of occasions (see for instance Dix, 2011).  
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According to Wexler, this worldview holds that government leadership should look to 
regulation to create stability, to prevent problems from occurring and to limit the 
unfairness of the entrepreneurial view’s solutions.  In this approach, the party has found 
natural allies in the labour movement. 
The NDP has also been able to promote a social justice agenda to appeal to 
adherents of the communitarian worldview, described by Wexler.  Many feel the NDP 
competes with the Green Party for votes, including Green Party leader Jane Sterk 
(Burrows, 2012).  However, it is not clear how many Green voters would voter for the 
NDP if their preferred party did not exist. 
2.5 PESTs 
A number of political, economic, social and technological (PESTs) forces shape 
politics.  Parties must adapt if they wish to be meaningful in tomorrow’s landscape. 
Section 2.2.1.1 has already discussed one of the most important political factors: 
campaign-spending limits.  Other rules set by government include the length of the 
campaign period, reporting requirements, and the voter data supplied by Elections BC.   
The economic factors shaping the industry are interesting but not particularly 
important in terms of OPPEPs.   
Social factors, such as changing demographics, are important.  The well-noted 
phenomenon of more people spending more time online may make people more open to 
participating in OPPEPs.  Clarke (2010) noted that voters are increasingly using online 
media to inform voting decisions.  As highlighted in Figure 3, located on page 13, 
Statistics Canada (2010) showed most Canadian youth are using social networks, 
making this a potential forum to reach first time voters.  
Social factors change over time.  “Effective brand management requires 
proactive strategies to maintain or enhance brand equity in the face of change” (Keller, 
1998, p. 501).  I will discuss the importance of adapting the brand in section 2.6.1.3.  It is 
important for parties to keep up with changing social attitudes if they wish to stay 
relevant to their target voters. 
The technological factors affecting politics are interesting.  In the past, people 
had fewer media sources to inform their voting decisions compared to today.  Now, 
social networks are playing a role in educating the public about current events.  Because 
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of this, politicians can reach the masses directly through the internet (if the masses 
choose to listen).   
Technology is also opening up the possibility of niche marketing.  Marketing firms 
are building databases that outline significant demographic, economic and social data 
about individual voters.8  Marketers can use these databases to identify potential 
customers and to classify them by segment.  Political parties can do the same and can 
send targeted messaging that will help to appeal to each voter.  Parties using this 
marketing technology may be more likely to 
succeed in the future.  OPPEP participants will 
provide information that parties can use for this 
kind of marketing effort by informing the party of 
which topics interest individual participants. 
2.6 Sources of Advantage 
The industry analysis points to sources of 
advantage that fall into two categories: customer 
utility advantages, which are the ways a party can 
differentiate itself, and cost advantages that allow 
a party to operate efficiently.  These advantages 
will allow us to compare strategic options to host 
OPPEPs. 
Table 3 highlights some of the industry’s 
success factors.  These factors line up with the 
advantages noted by Tomz and van Houweling, 
as cited in section 2.3.  The cost advantages 
come from factors cited in Sayers (1998) work 
and research cited in the following sections.  The 
advantages are not weighted in light of Levine’s 
(2005, p. 63) finding that “there is little research 
to help us understand how each individual 
                                                     
8
 While beyond the scope of this paper, some parties have reportedly gone so far as to purchase marketing 
data and developing niche database marketing strategies (Cillizza, 2007).  Others simply use databases to 
track voter contacts so that identified supporters can be encouraged to vote. 
Table 3 - Sources of advantage for 
parties 
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follower decides” who to vote for.  Different voters may decide how to cast their ballot 
based on a number of factors and different parties may extract value from their 
operations in numerous ways.  Instead of weighting the factors, I will use these sources 
of advantage to identify trends and graphically display the relative advantages of various 
options. 
2.6.1 Customer Utility Advantages 
Parties can offer many utility advantages in their struggle to give voters a reason 
to vote for them.  Three major utility advantages are leadership, the record in office and 
the platform.  These three line up with Tomz and van Houweling’s (2008) observations 
about voter choice. 
2.6.1.1 Party Leadership 
Leadership is an important advantage to parties in B.C.’s politics.  Our 
Westminster-style government grants executive power to the leader who wins the most 
seats in the house.  A voter cannot vote separately for a local representative and a 
premier and most people are more concerned about who leads government.  Blais et al. 
(n.d.) confirmed this to be the case for English Canada, when they found that the local 
candidate plays a decisive role for only 5% of voters.  OPPEPs would provide an 
opportunity to influence perceptions of party leadership.  
2.6.1.2 Record in Office 
Voters can use party records to judge if potential leaders have the right vision 
and the ability to turn it into a reality.  Past performance falls under the competence and 
trustworthiness categories that Tomz and van Houweling (2008) noted factor into voter 
decision making.  This means that a party’s record in office can be an advantage, or 
disadvantage in this sector.  Voters know that usually only one party will control 
government and they may look at each team’s record to determine which will do the best 
job.  Many voters use historical performance to predict future behaviour.  However, 
history is only relevant for a limited time.  Skilfully used, an OPPEP might improve 
participants’ attitudes toward a party’s record. 
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2.6.1.3 Platform and Policies 
Platforms provide a source of differentiation since many voters look at promises 
before deciding how they will vote.  More than half of Canadians consider campaign 
promises before casting a ballot, according to a Nanos Research poll reported by CTV 
(2011).  An important advantage is the ability to adapt platforms to changing public 
views.  This is difficult because, as Keller (1998) noted, it is hard to change voters’ brand 
associations once they are established; however, Belch et al (2005) noted that it is 
important to adapt the brand to ensure that it stays relevant to consumers. 
Tomz and van Houweling’s (2008) study found that most voters, 58% in their 
estimate, prefer policies that closely match the voter’s goal.  The study also found that 
28% of voters appeared to discount candidate positions as not entirely realistic and then 
chose candidates whose discounted position is closest to the voter’s preference.  The 
remainder appeared to perceive issues as two-sided and choose based on which side 
the voter prefers.  This means that parties should adopt policies that closely match the 
preference of the party’s target voter segments, including on OPPEPs. 
An OPPEP could improve the party’s chances in two ways in this context.  First, it 
could help a party to develop policy that is more supportable.  Second, it might improve 
attitudes towards the platform amongst participants, who may then share their 
perceptions with friends and neighbours.   
2.6.2 Cost and Resource Advantages 
The fact that voting is free prevents price competition.  However, parties search 
for cost advantages that allow them to get the most from operations.  Cost advantages 
allow parties to reach more voters and to persuade them to elect their candidates. 
B.C.’s election spending limits (discussed in section 2.2.1.1) force parties to be 
efficient.  Elections BC, the independent non-partisan agency that oversees provincial 
elections in B.C., enforces these limits, as one former cabinet minister recently found out 
when he was fined for exceeding the limit (Heed v. The Chief Electoral Officer of B.C., 
2011).  A party can achieve several cost advantages.  
2.6.2.1 Ability to Garner Positive Media Coverage 
One way to market utility benefits to voters is to earn free news coverage.  Sitting 
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governments always have two advantages in this context: their control of public 
spending and the advantage of having more elected politicians than rivals. 
The ability to control public spending allows the holder to create and announce 
new government programs.  Opposition politicians do not have this advantage.  
Governments can implement and take credit for popular ideas.  Further, the fact that 
government can surprise the opposition with announcements means that opponents 
have a limited time to formulate a response before press deadlines. 
Being able to control public spending is not always an advantage.  Governments 
must sometimes make unpopular spending cuts during a recession, or face the 
unpleasant challenge of running a deficit and appearing to be fiscally incompetent. 
Having more elected politicians means that a party has more voices giving its 
side of the story to newspapers.  This means that voters are more likely to hear a party’s 
message when that party has more representatives.   
OPPEPs provide a way around poor media coverage, by directly communicating 
with supporters.  They may also improve policy limiting the time spent putting out fires, 
which in itself can generate poor publicity. 
2.6.2.2 Ability to Attract Volunteers 
As discussed in section 2.2.2.6, only 50% of people voted in the most recent 
provincial election in B.C.   Parties can improve their odds by increasing the number of 
supporters who actually vote.   In theory, a party could win a majority of votes in every 
riding with only 13% of popular support, so long as each of those supporters casts a 
ballot during the election. Volunteers can help in this regard by identifying supporters 
and urging them to vote.  Nickerson (2005) showed that partisan phone banking could 
increase voter turnout by just over 3%.  This can help to decide a close election, if the 
right voters are contacted, i.e. those that support the party.   
This advantage depends in part on the other sources of advantage.  Some 
parties hold greater appeal to potential volunteers while others have less.  However, the 
more popular a party is, the more likely it is to attract people interested in volunteering 
for the cause.   Marketing through OPPEPs could help to attract and retain more 
volunteers. 
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2.6.2.3 Ability to Move Volunteers to Swing Ridings 
As discussed in section 2.2.1.1 on volunteers, unpaid labourers are critical to 
success in electoral politics.  However, a volunteer in a close riding matters more than 
one in a sure riding. 
Most of the province’s 85 electoral districts are solidly behind one party or 
another.  Twenty-four MLAs won their seats by more than 25% of the vote in the 2009 
election and a further 24 MLAs won by margins between 15% and 25% (Elections BC, 
2010).  It makes little sense to use hundreds of volunteers in ridings that the party is 
going to win or lose by a landslide.  Thus, moving volunteers to seats that are more 
marginal can make a difference in the ways described in section 2.2.1.1.  Moving 
workers is difficult because many volunteers may prefer to work for candidates they 
know personally (Sayers, 1998).  Candidates may also become upset if the central party 
moves volunteers to other ridings. 
OPPEPs may help in this respect by building an engaged audience that may be 
more receptive to invitations to volunteer on key ridings.  However, OPPEPs run by 
individual candidates would be likely to build attachment to those candidates and make 
matters worse. 
2.6.2.4 Fundraising Capabilities 
While fundraising is not a cost advantage, the ability to raise money reduces the 
need to be efficient.  Levitt’s research (1994) found that the ability to raise funds 
depends, at least partly, on many of the other success factors.  Laws imposing 
campaign-spending limits, such as Division 5 of B.C.’s Election Act (1996), limit any 
obtainable advantage in this respect as discussed in section 2.2.1.1. 
Some parties appeal more to donors while others have more difficulty raising 
donations.  In addition, some parties put more effort into fundraising.  The B.C. Liberals 
raised $9.6 million in 2010 compared with $4 million raised by the NDP, $139,000 raised 
by the Green Party and $61,000 raised by the Conservatives (BC Liberal Party, 2011, b; 
BC NDP, 2011; Green Party, 2011; BC Conservative Party 2011).  This shows the 
disparity in funds raised and the advantage that parties can obtain in this context.  
OPPEPs may help parties improve this measure by developing better policy that would 
attract potential donors. 
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2.6.2.5 Elected Representatives 
Having a local elected representative who can speak with community groups, 
voters and local media outlets is an advantage.  MLAs can build public support both for 
themselves and for the party while receiving a public salary.  Elected representatives can 
meet with their constituents and community groups to help solve their problems and 
advance the public interest.  This activity helps to build support.  Also, as identified in 
section 2.2.1.3, having more elected officials helps to gain positive media coverage.   
2.6.2.6 Links to Collaborators 
Marketers stress the importance of the five Cs, including collaborators.9  As 
shown in section 2.2.2.1, collaborators are also important in politics, since they can gain 
media attention, provide donations and attract volunteers.  Important potential 
collaborators include unions, community groups and interest groups.  OPPEPs pose a 
risk to links with collaborators.  Inviting the public into decision-making might reduce the 
privileged status that parties may grant to some collaborators. 
2.6.2.7 Ability to Communicate Directly with the Public 
It takes skill to draft communication materials that can get traction.  I am not only 
referring to press releases, since newsletters, advertisements, and videos matter too.  
Governing parties have an advantage in this respect.  Governments can implement new 
policies and programs that politicians can announce with much fanfare.  These 
announcements can be supported with press releases, video clips and informational 
packages developed by government communication officers.  Opposition parties must 
rely on their smaller caucus staffs, while fringe parties receive no public financing.  
Engagement projects would provide a reason for more voters to pay attention.  The 
engaged OPPEP audience may be more interested in these party communications. 
2.6.3 Concluding Thoughts on Sources of Advantage 
There are millions of potential voters in B.C. and it is not possible for a party to 
contact each one directly; nor is it possible through that contact to convince each to 
change their preferences.  Therefore, the utility advantages would seem to be more 
                                                     
9
 The other four Cs are company, customer, competitor and context.  Silk (2006) provides a detailed 
discussion of these topics.   
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important since Tomz and van Houweling (2008) note that these form the basis of voter 
choice.  However, cost advantages can also help as shown by the research cited in 
section 2.6.2 of this paper. 
On the cost advantage side, I would give low weight to fundraising capabilities in 
light of Levitt’s (1994) research.  Since a party’s goal usually is to convince a large 
number of voters to support it over rivals, this paper will place greater weight on those 
advantages that enable communication with many people.  This only leaves out the 
ability to move volunteers to swing ridings.  This is important, but the research of Sayers 
(1998) showed that this could be difficult if the volunteer has a personal attachment to 
the candidate.  Therefore, while advantageous, it can be difficult to achieve and only 
applies to swing ridings. 
An OPPEP should ideally improve all of the sources of advantage.  Chapter 3 will 
look at several different ways to implement an OPPEP before comparing each on the 
sources of advantage.  Ideally, one of these options for implementing the OPPEP will be 
clearly better on each source of advantage, however, the real world is complicated and 
an option that is better for one source of advantage may be worse for another.  If trade-
offs are observed within the options presented in Chapter 3, managers should prefer 
those that improve utility advantages, and use cost advantages (minus fundraising) to 
break ties.  Within the cost advantages, the ability to attract volunteers would be a good 
goal for the party to improve, since it is possible to get online participants to become real 
world volunteers.  Chapters 3 and 5 will explore these ideas in greater detail. 
2.7 Key Insights 
Traditional channels that parties use to communicate with voters include direct 
contact10 through telephone and door knocking, mass media, and flyers.  News media 
may report on the party in unfavourable ways and the other traditional methods can be 
labour intensive.  However, social networks are emerging as tools that allow politicians 
to speak directly with those voters who choose to listen.  Parties can directly reach 
supporters en masse through social media, increasing supporters’ willingness to support 
the party and become involved as volunteers. 
We have seen that many voters choose how to vote based on the advantages 
                                                     
10
 Direct contact occurs both through politicians and through paid and voluntary workers. 
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described earlier in this paper.  Any party wishing to improve their standing should look 
to improve these sources of advantage.  An OPPEP could improve the participants’ 
perception of the party, creating word of mouth referrals. 
On the cost advantage side, Nickerson (2005) provides strong evidence that 
volunteers in close ridings can make the difference between victory and defeat, if they 
perform the right activities.  The OPPEP can help to build relationships with potential 
volunteers, thus improving this source of advantage. 
The research cited under the analysis of sources of advantage and the supply 
chain helps to sort out which factors are more important.  This will help to compare the 
strategic options to open a public policy dialogue.  In particular, this paper will give more 
weight to utility advantages, the ability to attract volunteers and cost advantages that 
enable mass communications.  Chapter 3 will explore these topics in more detail. 
Statistics Canada (2010) showed that most Canadian youth of voting age use 
social networks.  Using social networks to engage youth could help to win their first 
votes.  Shachar (2003) showed that first choices are enduring for most voters in western 
democracies.  Winning first-time voters may create a long-term sustainable advantage. 
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3: Strategic Options 
Many elected politicians already use social media in a variety of different ways.  I 
will explore some of these uses in section 3.1.  This will help me place the OPPEP into 
the context of existing political uses of social media before devoting the rest of the 
chapter to reviewing the strategic alternative ways that parties could set up an OPPEP.  I 
will evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each option against the criteria 
outlined in section 2.6.   
There are three major decisions to make once a party decides to implement an 
OPPEP.  The first is whether to allow anyone to provide feedback, or else to keep the 
project limited to invited participants.  The second is whether to display feedback or to 
keep submissions private.  Table 5, located on page 34, shows the advantages and 
disadvantages of these choices, which are discussed in detail in sections 3.2 to 3.4.  The 
third decision concerns the question of which agency should oversee the project.  
Possible overseers include party headquarters, but publicly funded agencies such as 
caucus communications or the civil service could manage the project on behalf of a 
party.  This chapter will explore these decisions, as well as the question of which online 
channels should host the project.  Later chapters will discuss risk mitigation strategies 
and project design.   
3.1 Examples of New Media and Policy Engagement in Politics 
At home and across the world, parties are exploring how to use new media to 
reach voters.  Before discussing the strategic options to implement an OPPEP, I will 
review some related political projects covering both social media and policy 
engagement.  Some policy engagement projects run offline, while many uses of new 
media do not seek feedback on policy ideas.  These projects will provide ideas that will 
inform this chapter and later sections. 
3.1.1 Open Platforms 
The BC Liberals ran an “Open Platform” before the 2009 election (BC Liberal 
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Party, n.d., a).  This project was similar to an OPPEP, except in the respect that the 
party did not ask specific questions.   Instead, the Open Platform allowed people to 
contribute ideas on any topic, for potential inclusion in the liberal platform.  Party 
organizers received and reviewed more than 1,500 submissions.   
Open platforms do not guide people to think about the problems the party is 
trying to solve.  It is a matter of chance whether a submission deals with a problem that 
organizers will prioritize and try to solve.  This means that a participant may prepare a 
thoughtful analysis, only to see nothing happen as a result.  The participant might then 
feel slighted and the party would miss an opportunity to get feedback on an issue that it 
specifically is trying to solve.  An OPPEP could supplant a future open platform. 
3.1.2 Obama’s 2008 campaign 
Harfoush’s book (2009) talks about her experience on the US presidential 
candidate Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign’s social media team.  Not only did Obama 
win the Democratic Party nomination over rival candidate Clinton, he decisively won the 
general election, with 365 Electoral College votes to the 173 votes gained by Republican 
Party candidate McCain.  The campaign team used new media to attract online followers 
and went one-step further; it motivated followers to act in the offline world.  Many have 
attributed his success, in part, to the use of social media (Aaker & Chang, 2009). 
Ms. Harfoush discussed how the team motivated offline action.  Studies have 
shown that offline activities can have a significant impact on electoral results.  Nickerson 
(2005) showed that partisan phone banking could provide an important boost in tight 
races.  Obama’s team divided the voters list and had online volunteers contact small 
portions of the list to identify which party they supported in order to build a list of 
Democratic Party voters.  The team also contacted Obama supporters to encourage 
them to vote on polling day.  Social media participants received a small list of names, 
perhaps as few as five, making this an easier way of volunteering when compared to 
going into a campaign office.   
Obama’s team also used social media to build crowds at events.  Larger crowds 
can help to create the appearance of proximity to power and a contribution to a 
meaningful cause that, Butler and Collins (1994) noted, attracts volunteers.   
The team built a scoring system that volunteers could use to prove their 
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commitment.  The campaign awarded volunteers points for activities such as fundraising 
or performing voter identification.  The points had expiry dates so volunteers had to 
continue working to maintain their rankings.  Some unpaid workers received other 
rewards, such as exclusive campaign event tickets or invitations to other activities. 
These uses of online media are important for all parties to consider.  An OPPEP 
can build a list of supporters that parties could motivate to carry out volunteer work.  
Ideally, the engagement project would attract new volunteers to the party which would 
increase the number of workers available to carry out campaign tasks. 
3.1.3 Conservative Policy Forum 
Britain’s Conservative Party runs the “Conservative Policy Forum” (CPF).  This is 
an offline version of an OPPEP.  Members read background information pieces, 
commonly known as backgrounders, on policy topics, and then local branches meet to 
discuss ideas.  Each local group submits its ideas to the party for consideration by the 
minister responsible for the topic. 
This approach could strengthen local riding associations across the country.  It 
provides social interaction that, as Unger (1991) notes, motivates volunteers.  The CPF 
also engages political volunteers by bringing them closer to power and helping them to 
contribute to a significant cause, which, as Collins and Butler (1994) note, are important 
motivations for political volunteers.  The CPF may also keep local networks strong, a 
challenge noted by Sayers (1998).  
The CPF has one disadvantage when compared with OPPEPs.  Online forums 
allow people to participate when convenient.  This is important in an era of dual income 
families that may be unable to come to events.  Single parents would likewise have 
similar difficulties.  On balance, I suspect the CPF will pay dividends for the party and 
outsiders should therefore pay attention. 
3.1.4 The NDP Facebook and Twitter Strategy 
Galloway (2011) noted that the federal NDP had a social media strategy that 
incorporated Twitter feeds, an iPhone app and QR coding.  The NDP used these tools 
during the federal election to help supporters get information about the party.  While 
other factors were at play during the election, the party achieved a victory and moved 
from fourth place in the House of Commons to second. 
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Surprisingly, the provincial NDP’s strategy seems less advanced.  While the party 
invited Rahaf Harfoush, who wrote a book about her experience on Obama’s social 
media team, to speak at the party’s 2009 B.C. convention, the BC NDP’s Twitter and 
Facebook accounts do not seem to act on some of the recommendations offered in her 
book.  Table 4 below shows that the party’s Facebook account seems to only push 
messages out to supporters, rather than ask followers to become more involved with the 
party. 
Table 4 - Comparison of Facebook uses - January 1, 2012 - March 7, 2012 
  
Share a 
press 
release or 
statement 
Share 
media 
coverage 
Event 
Invitation 
Ask 
followers 
to join 
party or 
volunteer 
Share 
multi-
media 
Content 
Encourage 
followers 
to connect 
with other 
followers Other 
# of NDP posts 40 3 0 2 4 1 1 
% 78% 6% 0% 4% 8% 2% 2% 
# of Liberal posts 46 9 4 10 25 1 0 
% 48% 9% 4% 11% 26% 1% 0% 
 
While I am not privy to the BC NDP’s social networking strategy, a scan of the 
party’s Facebook account provides a breakdown of the party’s Facebook activity 
between January 1st and March 7th 2012.  Table 4 shows that 84% of the party’s posts 
simply share a news release, a media statement, or a published story.  This educates 
the online followers but does not invite people to participate in a two-way relationship 
with the party.  A two-way relationship may encourage more people to become actively 
involved with the party.  Despite current upcoming by-elections in two ridings, the party 
has only put out one post so far to introduce its followers to the candidates’ Facebook 
accounts.  As of the date of writing this section, there have been no invitations to 
volunteer in the by-elections.  The party’s Twitter account follows a similar strategy to its 
Facebook account.   
While the party does not appear to have a blog, it does encourage followers to 
post messages on other blogs and provides tips for supporters (BC NDP, n.d., c).  
However, the party does not appear to update this list frequently, since the top blog has 
been dormant for some time. 
The party’s MLAs may each have individual social media strategies, but this party 
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appears to use social media mostly to push out information prepared for other formats. 
3.1.5 The B.C. Liberal Facebook Strategy 
As shown above, the BC Liberals’ Facebook strategy is more diverse than the 
NDP’s.  The party pushes out pre-packaged materials developed for other formats, but it 
also advertises events and opportunities to become involved.  This gives supporters a 
chance to engage with the party and attempts to convert online support into offline 
action. The liberals post more video to create a multimedia experience for followers.  
This party also appears to be trying to build relationships with bloggers and social media 
users, by sponsoring social media camps (Social Media Camp, 2011). 
The party’s Twitter feed devotes more space to re-Tweeting the posts of 
followers, MLAs, and others.  Re-Tweeting followers’ posts may be a conscious attempt 
to connect followers with each other.  This could help to build a community. 
The party is also developing an “Ideas Lab”.  This is similar to the Open Platform 
except that the party will publish feedback and other users can comment on responses.  
This party has not announced the lab at the time of writing so it is too early to say how 
popular it will become.  If the liberals use their legislative majority to implement some of 
the suggested changes, they are likely to attract and retain a significant following. 
3.1.6 Summary of Case Lessons 
The most important case lesson comes from the Obama campaign.  An OPPEP 
should not be limited to improving policy.  Organizers should look at how the community 
could be a source of volunteers.   
Some parties appear to be using social media to host a one-way conversation 
with followers.  While this may educate followers, it does not build the community, nor 
does it encourage people to come out to events. 
3.2 Open vs. “By Invitation Only” Forums 
A major decision facing parties is whether to run open or closed forums.  This will 
influence the acquisition of followers who may become volunteers.  Table 5, displayed 
on the following page, outlines the advantages and disadvantages of each option in 
combination with the next major design decision, which is whether a party should display 
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feedback or keep it private.  
Table 5 - Summary of major decisions for public policy engagement 
 
Private Feedback Public Dialogue 
O
p
en
 C
o
n
su
lt
at
io
n
 
Pros:  
 The project will gain more participants than through an 
invitation only OPPEP and the party may gain more 
supporters. 
 Minimal pressure to implement popular suggestions 
since feedback is not public. 
 Participants cannot treat each other negatively without 
dialogue. 
Cons: 
 Participants are less likely to return to the site without 
an engaging discussion. 
 Without dialogue, participants will not expose problems 
with responses. 
Pros: 
 Having more participants makes it more likely that 
parties will attract new supporters. 
 Dialogue can motivate some participants to take part. 
 More weaknesses in ideas are exposed. 
Cons: 
 Rivals could embarrass the party (Macnamara et al., 
2010, p. 234). 
 Self-selected participants may be biased (Clarke, 2010). 
 Abusive participants may drive away others. 
 Showing responses increases pressure to implement 
suggestions, even ones that do not make sense. 
In
vi
ta
ti
o
n
 O
n
ly
 (
C
lo
se
d
 C
o
n
su
lt
at
io
n
) 
Pros: 
 Invited participants feel special. 
 Parties face minimal pressure to implement feedback 
because responses are not public. 
 Participants cannot be nasty to each other. 
Cons: 
 Invitations raise participants’ expectations that 
feedback will be implemented. 
 The lack of dialogue means users are not creating 
interesting content for others and followers cannot 
expose problems in other responses. 
Pros: 
 Opponents will not be able to use the project to advance 
their own interests. 
 The invite makes participants feel special. 
 Abusive participants can be uninvited. 
 Dialogue maintains participants’ interest. 
Cons: 
 The OPPEP is less likely to attract new supporters. 
 This option contains the most pressure to implement 
recommendations – even if not wise.   
 
Running an open forum could attract more participants than an invitation only 
vehicle.  Engaging more participants means that more people will learn about the party’s 
activities and have a role in shaping decisions.  Participants may be more likely to 
believe the party represents them, something that Pammett and LeDuc (2003) correlated 
with voting in Canada.  People who have had a say may be more likely to defend the 
action at the water cooler and are more likely to volunteer or donate.  Supporters who 
understand the issues are more likely to convince friends to support the party too.  This 
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contrasts with closed forums, where participants only take part by invitation.  Restricting 
participation limits the acquisition of new supporters. 
Another advantage of allowing more people to participate is that more feedback 
increases the likelihood that participants will identify potential landmines.  Decision 
makers could address the identified issues in the resulting policy change, limiting the 
time spent cleaning up mistakes.  However, open forums are more labour intensive, as 
the party will receive more feedback requiring more effort to analyse submissions.   
Open forums provide an opportunity for rivals to hijack the platform (Macnamara, 
Bamford & Betts, 2010).  Rivals could skew the results.  This could force the party to 
ignore the ‘majority’ feedback, if it does not represent broader public opinion, or at least 
the opinion of the party’s target voter segments, making the party appear undemocratic 
or uncommitted to engaging the public through its own forum.  Neither outcome would 
help the party gain an advantage. 
A “By Invitation Only” forum would reduce the volume of submissions that must 
be analysed.  This is important if minimal staff resources are available for the project. 
Closed forums may solve the self-selection problem posed by open forums.  
Online communities might not represent the wider public (Clarke, 2010).  A party may 
need to ignore the online feedback, even if it is in consensus, if it does not feel that the 
wider population, or at least the party’s target voter segments, agrees with this view.  
Limiting participation would also make it difficult for special interest groups to skew 
results.   
Unfortunately, closed forums would not draw as many new people into the party 
as compared to open forums.  While improving policy helps to attract new supporters, 
parties running open forums may also attract new members who can create a buzz.   
Leaders must balance these issues before deciding on an open or closed site.  If 
one goal is to attract volunteers, then organizers should establish open forums.  
However, if the only goal is to retain volunteers, then closed forums may be better. 
3.3 Published vs. Private Feedback 
Publishing feedback enables participants to debate one another.  Participants 
may expose flaws in possible solutions, flaws that might otherwise go unnoticed.  It is 
better to prevent issues from arising than to put out fires. 
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Unfortunately, publishing feedback allows participants to attack each other, aided 
by the “dissociative anonymity” problem noted by Suler (2004) where anonymous users 
are not held to account for their actions.  People often feel strongly about their positions 
and this can lead to negative behaviour directed toward participants who disagree.  The 
resulting behaviour can drive the right people away from the site and retain the wrong 
people.  A party could moderate posts to prevent participants from attacking each other.  
However, moderating posts often raises cries of censorship.  This can cause its own 
problems.   
Another issue with publishing feedback is that it can create a forum “for vested 
interests and the ‘usual suspects’ among political actors to hold the stage” (Macnamara, 
et al., 2010, p. 234).  Interest groups and rivals may use the forum to promote a view not 
endorsed by the majority (or at least the party’s target voter segments).  This would 
require a difficult choice about whether to implement the policy or not.  Implementing a 
policy opposed by the majority risks the wrath of the electorate.  However, rivals may 
frame a decision to ignore feedback as undemocratic.  This is a serious charge for any 
party to face and online participants will be less motivated to contribute their feedback if 
they feel the party is not sincere about acting on the advice received.  “Engaging citizens 
online raises legitimate expectations that public input will be used in policy making” 
(OECD, 2003, p. 18). 
Open forums host dialogue.  This turns control of the brand over to participants 
(Dunne, 2012).  Losing this control is acceptable if it helps to gain advantages 
elsewhere.  However, the self-selected group of OPPEP participants may not be up to 
the task of appealing to the broader population and might be too small to gain a 
compensating advantage.  Therefore, careful thought is required before going down this 
path. 
Saebo, Rose and Molka-Danielson (2010, p. 410) stated that “Ainsworth et al. 
(2005) found [that online] discussions often ended in irrelevant and inconsequential topic 
areas.”  There is no point in investing resources to host a discussion that leads nowhere. 
Keeping submissions private offers several advantages.  It prevents negative 
debates from arising and does not create a platform for rivals to advance their own 
agendas.  It also prevents an irrelevant discussion from occurring by not having any 
dialogue between participants.  Unfortunately, there are also some drawbacks to 
consider.  Avoiding dialogue will increase the potential for mistakes.  Participants may 
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notice problems with proposals that come forward.  It is always better to prevent 
problems from occurring than to lose time and credibility resolving these problems later. 
On balance, open dialogues create content that may attract more members 
(provided the dialogue is not toxic) and potentially attract more volunteers.  However, the 
dialogue puts the party’s brand management strategy at risk and provides a platform for 
rivals.  Therefore, parties should look to keep feedback private. 
3.4 Strategic Options  
Combining the two major decisions, which are whether to publish feedback and 
whether to limit the project to invited participants, leaves several basic options to 
consider.  Table 6 presents the alternatives that I will discuss thoroughly in sections 
3.3.1 – 3.3.7.  The appendix describes the underlying assumptions supporting the cost 
estimates provided in each section. 
Table 6 - Strategic options for online public policy engagement 
Strategy Type Potential Strategies 
Passive/Ignore 1. Do not create a public policy engagement site. 
2. Scan existing sites to find ideas and identify public opinion. 
Keep public feedback private 3. Host a “by invitation only” web site with private feedback. 
4. Post questions to a website and receive private feedback. 
Post feedback for participants to see 5. Host an “invitation only” dialogue to discuss policy. 
6. Host an open online forum to discuss public policy. 
 
3.4.1 Do Not Create a Public Policy Engagement Site 
This option is the easiest to implement.  It consumes no resources and creates 
no expectation that the party will act on responses.  Unfortunately, this alternative has a 
major shortcoming: parties that are slow to initiate an OPPEP miss an opportunity to 
influence first time voters.  This is particularly important given that voters usually pick the 
same party in subsequent elections (Shachar, 2003).  It is only a matter of time before 
one party starts an OPPEP and waiting costs the others first mover advantage.  The first 
mover game tree in Figure 7, shown on the following page, shows the sequential game 
in a two party system.  While B.C.’s political system appears to have three or four major 
parties at present, the tree still provides a useful simplification. 
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Acting on this option also changes industry structure.  Even a minimal OPPEP 
could cost $150,000 per year, as discussed in the appendix.  This is far more than the 
BC Conservatives were able to fundraise in 2010 (BC Conservatives, 2011); this may 
create an entry barrier for third parties.  It may also be harder for rivals to shake the 
loyalty of supporters who feel more closely connected to their party. 
It may be argued that third parties could use volunteers to run the project.  This is 
possible, but it would be hard to achieve the same consistent flow of topics, thus risking 
disengaging participants.  It will also be hard to find volunteers willing to put in the 
research required to draft quality backgrounder articles, thus exposing the party to risks.  
Lastly, it may be harder to find participants who want to contribute to a project that will 
not make a difference because the party has little ability to influence public policy.  After 
all, Butler and Collins (1994) noted that a desire to contribute to a worthwhile endeavour 
or to be close to power motivates many volunteers.  A fringe party would have a harder 
time convincing participants that it offers either benefit. 
3.4.2 Scan Existing Sites to Identify Public Opinion and Capture Ideas 
Existing social media groups can provide a trove of information that organizers 
could review to identify public opinion.  Participants can identify potential issues with 
Figure 7 - First mover game tree 
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proposed solutions and provide a barometer of public opinion11.   
This option offers the advantage that the party is not committed to acting on 
responses.  The feedback received from a consultation may endorse an impractical or 
unpopular position.  Interest groups can magnify this risk by skewing results.  Solutions 
put forward by consultees might only benefit a few people, at the expense of the wider 
population.  Alternatively, proposed solutions may be inconsistent with the party’s 
previous policies and could thus impair brand consistency.  There would be minimal 
pressure to implement this input, in contrast to the scenario where parties ask for 
suggestions; the OECD (2003) suggests that requesting input would create expectations 
that this feedback would be used.   
There are disadvantages with this option.  Parties could not directly ask 
questions, nor could they provide background information.  Politicians could speculate 
about ideas to spur public debate, but this would not guarantee that opinion leaders ask 
their followers the right questions or provide good information to inform debate. 
Another disadvantage is that politicians could not take credit for consulting with 
the public on the ideas they implement.  If the party did not ask the question, it will not 
appear that leaders made the decision based on feedback.   
Participants would not be engaged with the party; therefore, they would be less 
likely to respond to a request to volunteer for the party. 
This option does not conflict with the other alternatives.  Politicians should use 
this approach, when appropriate, to gain the associated benefits.  It would make sense 
when a topic is too divisive for the party to ask participants on an OPPEP to respond to.  
The cost of this option will depend on the number of sites monitored and the frequency 
and depth of analysis.  Managers can choose how much to invest in this option and 
control the flow of work so that only the right amount of resources is used. 
3.4.3 “Invitation Only” with Private Feedback 
This alternative would create a channel for asking questions of a select group of 
consultees.  These invited participants would provide feedback on the questions asked.  
Participants would not be able to see each other’s submissions.   
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 Although Clarke (2010) warns the barometer could be biased. 
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This option does not make sense.  If participants can only take part by invitation, 
then invitations could be limited to people who can be trusted to engage in respectful 
dialogue.  Moderators could sanction members who break the rules of etiquette.  
Creating a dialogue would make the project more engaging satisfying a volunteer 
motivation identified by Unger (1991). 
Alternatively, if the feedback is private, then the party might as well leave the 
channel open to anyone wishing to participate.  More people will become involved 
increasing the odds of finding new supporters and volunteers.  Since this alternative is 
clearly inferior to the two other options, I will drop it from further consideration.  However, 
this would be the cheapest style of OPPEP to run, as shown in the appendix.  The 
appendix estimates that this style of project would cost $150,000 per year. 
3.4.4 Open Questions/Private Input 
This option builds on the Open Platform described in section 3.1.1, by providing a 
series of regular questions to focus participants and get regular feedback.   
This alternative improves matters by engaging people more frequently.  Asking 
questions reduces the odds that participants will feel slighted if the feedback is not used.  
Questions can be framed to focus participants on problems that government is trying to 
solve, increasing the odds that the feedback will have a demonstrable result.  Seeing the 
party’s action might motivate participants to continue taking part, particularly for those 
whose feedback is used.  This increases the odds of converting participants into 
volunteers. 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the other pros and cons of this option.  This option 
is relatively inexpensive at only $200,000 per year, as described in the appendix. 
3.4.5 Invitation Only Dialogue/Share Input with Participants 
This is similar to the option described in section 3.4.3, except that participants 
would be able to see each other’s comments.  The benefit of this option is that the 
dialogue creates content that would keep some participants coming back on a regular 
basis.  This will deepen commitment to the party and could increase the amount of time 
volunteered and the amount of money donated. 
Another benefit is that dialogue will potentially bring to light some problems with 
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the ideas that participants share.  If the decision makers do not anticipate these 
problems before implementing a solution, then the party may have to face what would 
have been avoidable problems. 
Unfortunately, as discussed in section 3.3, this option does not reach out as 
effectively to potential new supporters as would an open forum.  Parties choosing to 
implement this approach can expect to pay $250,000 per year in staff costs to manage 
this project, as identified in the appendix. 
3.4.6 Open Forum with Published Submissions 
This alternative would see the party create an open forum and allow anyone to 
participate.  Responses would be published allowing for a dialogue that may expose 
problems with the responses put forward by others. 
People participating in such a project will be seeking a positive experience.  This 
is unfortunate, because a few participants will behave inappropriately towards those who 
disagree with their views destroying that environment of trust that should characterize 
the community. Therefore, managers must carefully moderate comments.  This option is 
likely to attract the most participants and the most comments per question.  The 
appendix shows that parties could expect to pay $750,000 per year to operate this type 
of OPPEP.  Practically speaking, neither political party nor caucus budgets are large 
enough to afford this expense, as shown in the appendix.  Only the provincial 
government could easily spare the resources needed to run this type of OPPEP. 
3.4.7 Option Evaluation 
The previous sections discussed the relative advantages of each option.  Private 
feedback appears to work better for the utility advantages, protects party brand 
management strategies and does not risk visibly ignoring the majority’s feedback.  It also 
prevents some participants from creating a hostile environment. 
Open forums hold greater potential to attract followers.  Organizers could convert 
some followers into volunteers, increasing performance on the cost advantages relating 
to the number of volunteers.  Invitation only forums would be more useful if the goal is 
only to retain and strengthen support among existing followers, but this is a significant 
investment and many managers will want to attract new people to the fold. 
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As Table 7 plainly shows, parties should look to either an open forum with private 
submissions, or a closed forum with an open dialogue.  We should also look at Figure 9 
to see how this option fits with the parties’ goals for each segment.  
 
Table 7 - Ranking of strategic options 
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Figure 8 - How an open forum with private feedback would affect each voter segment 
 
Therefore, I recommend using an open forum with private submissions.  
However, it will be important to encourage people to visit the site.  Project managers 
should post notifications to social media accounts every time there is a new question.   If 
the social media feed allows comments, these comments should be monitored. 
3.5 Which Agency Should Manage the Project? 
There are multiple agencies capable of managing a public policy engagement 
project on behalf of elected officials.  The agencies that could manage the project 
include Government Communications and Public Engagement (GCPE), Caucus 
Communication teams, Party Communications and individual MLAs.  As discussed I 
Chapter 1 and in Sections 3.1.2 & 3.1.6, this paper concludes that the party’s 
communication team should directly manage the project.  However, some governments 
are implementing similar projects through their civil services12 while individual MLAs are 
taking implementing similar ideas through their individual social media accounts.  
Therefore, I will explore the advantages and disadvantages of each potential managing 
agency in sections 3.5.1 - 3.5.5 to explain why the party should manage the OPPEP 
directly. 
Each agency’s objectives differ, thus influencing how each can perform the 
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 Which includes GCPE in B.C. 
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project.  GCPE is an agency of government, not the party, and therefore it only serves 
the executive branch of government, the cabinet, no matter which party is in power.  It 
does not serve opposition members.  Caucus communication departments focus on the 
needs of their MLAs.  While caucus communication teams are not directly controlled by 
the party, these teams are controlled by the party’s MLAs.  Since taxpayers fund this 
group, it cannot help with party activities.  Parties are only funded by donations and can 
therefore be as political as they wish while individual MLAs have similar freedom.  Table 
8, compares each of the managing agencies.  The comparisons will be discussed in 
further detail in sections 3.5.1 - 3.5.5. 
Table 8 - Comparison of potential managing agencies 
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GCPE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Easy 
Caucus 
Communications 
Department 
No 
Only political staff can 
support these 
accounts. 
Yes No Yes 
Depends on whether the party 
forms government. 
Individual feeds for 
each MLA 
Yes 
Only political staff can 
support these 
accounts. 
Yes No Difficult Depends on the MLA. 
Party 
communications 
team 
Yes 
Only political staff can 
be involved and only 
after work hours. 
Yes No Yes 
Problem can only be solved if party 
is in government.  Otherwise, can 
advocate on the issue. 
3.5.1 Government Communications and Public Engagement (GCPE) 
This option is only available to governing parties because opposition parties are 
not able to direct the actions of civil servants.  A central team would canvass ministries 
for ideas and ensure that a regular flow of topics appears on the OPPEP.  Ministry 
experts could prepare backgrounders and answer questions raised by participants.  
Public funding would cover project costs making it free for political parties.  Government 
budgets are large enough to cover the cost of any of the options outlined in the 
appendix, unlike caucus and party budgets that may be insufficient. 
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A major downside of having GCPE run the project is that the account would 
remain under government control if there were a change in power.  A fully functioning 
OPPEP would be handed over to the new government should a rival win an election and 
the party would have to start again from scratch.  Another downside is that organizers 
cannot use the OPPEP to recruit volunteers into the party because the government runs 
the project.  This would miss the benefits described in section 3.1.2. 
3.5.2 Caucus Communications 
Caucuses have communication teams to support MLAs.  Their staffs are 
increasingly becoming social media experts.  One advantage of using caucus staff is that 
the channel would remain under the party’s control even if it lost an election13.  For 
opposition, this option is feasible unlike the alternative described above.  
Another advantage is that public funding would cover the cost.  However, having 
caucus communications run an OPPEP would require trade-offs within the caucus 
budget.  Based on the formulae listed in Metrics EFG (2008), neither caucus receives 
more than $3.2 million in funding.  This would rule out the open forum/public dialogue, 
since it would cost nearly $750,000 per year as shown in the appendix, but the other 
alternatives remain feasible.   
The disadvantage of using caucus teams is that ministry staff could not directly 
support consultations.  As noted by Macnamara et al. (2010, p. 233), “[s]enior policy 
maker involvement is essential to ensure online public consultation initiatives are not 
tokenism...”   This only affects governing parties, but it would affect the quality of 
consultations.  Ministry experts could not work directly with caucus staff to develop 
backgrounders to inform the debate, or to answer questions.  Political staff in ministerial 
offices could act as a go-between, or supplant the staff role as they become more expert 
in their ministries.  However, this adds a layer of complexity and is only available to a 
governing party14.  Ultimately, the minister responsible for the file will need to take up the 
cause to make the engagement meaningful.  Once each engagement is complete, it 
would be difficult to expect ministry staff to analyse the feedback.  Non-experts would 
have to review comments and prepare options for the minister to explore.  The minister 
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 Of course, caucus funding is tied to the number of members.  If the party is reduced to a rump caucus, it 
may no longer have the funding required to operate the project.   While rare, it does happen. 
14
 However, no option is available to opposition parties to use government employees to support the 
project. 
   46 
would then have to work through the options with departmental staff, rather than simply 
let the ministry manage the entire process. 
Another issue with this approach is that caucus communication officers already 
have seasonal periods with lengthy hours.  This would force the caucus to hire more 
communication officers, reduce their workload in other areas, or tolerate project inactivity 
for long stretches.  It is not likely that caucuses could hire more communication officers, 
since funding is limited.  It would be unpopular to increase caucus funding during this 
time of fiscal restraint.  Lightening the workload of staff in order to free up time for social 
media is not feasible.  Their existing work helps make voters aware of the actions of their 
elected representatives.  At this time, social media is a valuable supplement to traditional 
communications efforts, but not everyone uses these tools.  This means that traditional 
media will continue to play a role. 
The final issue with using caucus teams is that caucuses receive public funding.  
This means that caucuses could not use an OPPEP to recruit party volunteers. 
3.5.3 Party Communications Staff 
Using party communication officers to manage the OPPEP offers significant 
benefits.  The party does not receive public funding and can therefore recruit volunteers.  
In other respects, this option suffers from the same drawbacks as the option of using the 
caucus to manage the project, with the exception that the party communication staffs are 
smaller in number and it would be even more difficult to bridge the gap between ministry 
staff and the project.  As noted earlier, party budgets are limited.  Even the BC Liberals, 
who led the parties in fundraising in 2010, only raised $10 million in 2010 (BC Liberals, 
2011, b).  Therefore, this option may limit the use of open forums with public dialogues 
unless parties are willing to make trade-offs. 
3.5.4 Individual Members of the Legislative Assembly 
Many elected representatives already engage with their constituents through 
social media.  These efforts range from simply pushing out announcements to increase 
the reach of press releases, to efforts that connect community groups together.  Some 
even use social media to ask their constituents for their ideas.  This approach has the 
obvious benefit of branding the MLA within the social media community.  Voters who see 
the MLA listening to feedback received from constituents and followers are more likely to 
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become involved in the MLA’s riding association. 
Unlike caucus or government feeds, MLAs can actively use social media 
accounts during an election, when it is important to communicate with potential voters. 
The drawback is that it would take a substantial time commitment from each MLA 
to implement this alternative.  They would have to frequently monitor accounts and 
respond to constituents on a timely basis.  This poses a problem for MLAs who devote 
most of their time to legislative and constituency duties.  Meetings with community 
organizations and constituents often require significant follow up work in order to achieve 
a meaningful outcome.  Matters are worse for cabinet ministers who have responsibility 
for a ministry.  This leaves them with little time to manage their accounts and as a result, 
is unlikely to be a successful way of managing the project. 
Practically speaking, this option does not require funding since MLAs would 
handle the work.  However, since their time is limited, this would force each MLA to 
make trade-offs in their workloads. 
3.5.5 Recommended Project Management Team 
Given that all democratic governments will eventually lose an election, having 
GCPE manage the project is not a good idea.  The advantages of being able to use 
ministry staff support are offset by the disadvantages of the channel always being at the 
service of the incumbent government; meaning that outgoing governments could not 
take the intellectual property and data inherent in the channel with them.  This means 
the governing party would invest significant effort to build a following only to hand the 
OPPEP over to rivals if the opponent forms government. 
Caucus staff could manage the project, but they are already overworked and it 
would be difficult to decide which low priority tasks the caucuses could neglect in favour 
of the project.  It is also not possible to hire enough new staff to run the project, since the 
current economic challenges would make it difficult for legislators to increase caucus 
budgets while government is extracting wage freezes from public sector unions. 
There is one further drawback to using a publicly funded agency to run the 
project: the agency would own the data.  This means that parties could not recruit 
participants to join the party. 
Individual MLA feeds will not work well since it would be difficult to create and 
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find enough interesting new content for each member.  This would also multiply the work 
needed to analyse content and implement changes.  Further, every time an MLA loses 
their seat or resigns, the associated channel would become worthless. 
Therefore, by a process of elimination, we can conclude that each individual 
party should handle this project on their own behalf.  Each serious party already has the 
communications expertise and the understanding of social networking needed to 
proceed.  Some parties may not have enough staff resources to manage the project; 
however, they may be able to raise more funds to hire additional staff. 
3.6 Which Social Media Tools Should Parties Use to Host the Project? 
People interact via an array of online networks.  Each program has different 
features, providing different advantages.  People use each network for different 
purposes and some tools are more popular. 
Evans (2010, p. 18) said that “focusing [marketing] effort on a place where the 
[target] audience [does not look] is a common mistake.”  Managers should use buzz 
monitoring tools to help them locate their audiences.  After all, it does not make sense to 
be active in one forum when all of the party’s target voters are having conversations in 
another.  However, just because a tool is right for a party’s social media strategy does 
not mean that it will support the project.  Therefore, I will explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of each tool as potential project hosts before making a recommendation. 
Evans noted that communities are fluid.  Members move from one to another 
over time.  Therefore, I will not spend much time looking at where the audience is, since 
this may change before any party implements an OPPEP.  Rather, I will look at how 
suitable some popular social media tools would be as potential project hosts. 
Selecting the right program(s) is critical to achieving the maximum benefits 
possible from the project.  Some social networks are better suited to hosting dialogues, 
while others would allow private feedback.  Changing the channel once the project is in 
operation may be difficult, since it would risk disengaging participants who do not join the 
new network.  Decision makers must exercise care when selecting the channel. 
There are more social media tools than space available here to talk about them.  
Please see Table 9, located on page 49, for a summary of some tools that might be 
used to host the project. 
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Table 9 - Channel options 
Channel Benefits Disadvantages 
Facebook   Facebook offers a complete platform.  It allows the user to do 
most things that other social media tools permit. 
 
 Facebook aggregates comments allowing for discussion.   
 
 Users do not have anonymous accounts.  Followers posting 
under their own names are less likely to use vitriolic language. 
 
 16 million Canadians are already on Facebook 
(Checkfacebook.com, n.d.).  New accounts are free.   
 
 Friend finder tools help users find interesting accounts.   
 It is harder for politicians to 
attract a following with 
Facebook than on channels 
like Twitter, but not 
impossible as discussed in 
section 3.6.1.  
Twitter  It is easier for politicians to establish a following on Twitter than 
on Facebook. 
 
 Friend finder tools suggest you follow them same feeds as your 
friends.  This allows for rapid growth in the number of followers 
without major advertising costs.  
 Twitter only permits short 
messages.  This prevents 
detailed responses. 
 
 
YouTube   Takes advantage of the media skills of politicians.    
Blogs/ 
Websites with 
private 
submissions 
 Content management services make sites easy to maintain. 
 
 Allow for longer posts and unpublished feedback. 
 
 Gives the party maximum control over the look, feel and format. 
 Users have to choose to 
come back to see updates. 
 
 No friend finding tools to 
drive users to the site. 
 
 Responders can be 
anonymous.  This enables 
users to attack each other of 
responses are published. 
 
3.6.1 Facebook 
Facebook offers a complete multimedia platform.  Users can create appealing 
multimedia experiences.   
Facebook (n.d.) says it requires users “to provide their real names.”  This gets 
around the “dissociative anonymity” problem noted by Suler (2004), where anonymous 
users are not accountable for their actions.  Most people will self-moderate comments 
that they think might harm their reputations.  This could limit the aggressive and abusive 
behaviour that many have come to expect from other online discussion forums. 
The major benefit of Facebook is that it is so popular.  As of January 2012, it had 
16 million Canadian users (Checkfacebook.com, n.d.).  This means that many voters are 
already using the site and political feeds are available to those users who wish to follow 
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them.  This provides a large potential audience for parties to target. 
Another benefit is that Facebook is easy to use and it takes little effort to 
establish or maintain accounts.  This frees up time to focus on content creation and day-
to-day OPPEP work.  
One of the downsides of Facebook is that local politicians seem to have relative 
difficulty acquiring Facebook ‘friends’, the term used by the site to denote a connection 
between two Facebook accounts.  Many politicians maintain both Facebook and Twitter 
accounts.  Followers may view a politician’s Twitter feed as a source of news, without 
having to subscribe to the connotation carried by Facebook ‘friendship’.  If so, this might 
explain why many politicians have more Twitter followers than Facebook friends.  
Whatever the reason, it would appear that politicians are less popular on Facebook than 
Twitter as shown in Table 10.  This is particularly interesting given that the Star (2011) 
reports that half of Canadians use Facebook while Wikipedia (n.d.) reports that Twitter 
users do not make up more than 25% of the population of any country. 
 
 
 
Facebook would be very useful for an open forum with an unmoderated dialogue, 
Table 10 – Number of Facebook and Twitter followers for various political accounts as of January 2012 
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but is not well suited to the private submission format recommended for the project.   
3.6.2 Twitter 
Twitter is a popular tool to create a news feed and push information out quickly.  
According to Gauthier (2011), Twitter had 5 million Canadian users as of May 2011 and 
offers the advantage that politicians can attract followers more easily on Twitter than on 
Facebook. 
Unfortunately, Twitter only allows users to post messages with a maximum of 
140 characters.  This does not give enough room for detailed comments.  Given the 
complexity of most issues worth commenting on, more space is required to gather 
meaningful responses from participants.  Tweets could advertise a consultation on 
another site and share a link, but this does not make the site a good host for the 
OPPEP. 
3.6.3 YouTube 
YouTube is a good tool for sharing videos.  Most politicians receive camera 
training and can deliver engaging messages to voters so it can be easier to have a 
politician record a brief message than to write an equally engaging text message.  
Representatives share video messages with constituents relatively often, so most parties 
and caucuses have trained staff capable of quickly recording professional quality video.  
YouTube is easily linkable to other websites, allowing users to share videos. 
3.6.4 Websites with Private Submissions 
Today’s content management systems make it easy to maintain a website.  
Webmasters can install submission forms on the site to accept feedback from the public.  
Parties that do not wish to post feedback should use websites to collect responses.  
3.6.5 Recommended Platform 
The platform must support the design choices in earlier sections.  Parties that 
make different high-level design choices for their OPPEPs may wish to select different 
platforms to host the project.  Table 11 on the following page shows the recommended 
platform based on the choices described in section 3.4.  Parties that choose not to 
display feedback should still use social networks to promote the project.  Facebook and 
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Twitter accounts can send messages to followers, with links to the site every time the 
party asks a new question.  This will give followers another reason to pay attention to the 
party’s social networking activities. 
Table 11 - Recommended OPPEP platforms 
 Open Forums Invitation Only 
Unmoderated 
Published 
Feedback 
 Use Facebook to host the dialogue and other 
networks to draw participants in. 
 Host the dialogue on private blogs that 
require a login. 
Moderated 
Published 
Feedback 
 Host the dialogue on a moderated blog. 
 Use social networks to attract participants. 
 Host the conversation on a moderated 
blog. 
Undisplayed 
Feedback 
 Host a website with a submission form. 
 Use social media to attract participants. 
 Host a private website with a private 
login. 
 
Parties could choose to operate the project across multiple online platforms 
simultaneously.  However, this approach has a significant drawback.  More resources 
are required to manage multiple platforms.  Given the limited number of additional users 
that politicians could reach through additional channels, I do not recommend attempting 
to set up dialogues on multiple platforms.  However, parties should use the other 
platforms to advertise and link to the project. 
Before proceeding to the next set of design choices for the project, the next 
chapter will discuss major risks and potential risk management strategies. 
3.7 Key Insights 
Implementing an OPPEP will improve most of the identified sources of 
advantage.  Figure 9 on the following page highlights how the project would affect each 
input and marketing channel.  The figure also highlights the fact that undertaking the 
project could strain relationships with interest groups.  This is hardly surprising, because 
giving more weight to the public means that a party will have to pay less attention to the 
needs of collaborators. 
OPPEPs would create entry barriers limiting the ability of third parties to become 
serious political contenders or to siphon off votes from the major parties.  This could 
happen because the project costs would be likely to exceed the annual budgets of minor 
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parties, as I will show in the appendix. 
 
 
 
As discussed in section 3.4.7, parties should not display the feedback, since this 
could invite arguments between participants with differing views, potentially driving away 
more reasonable members.  It would also allow rivals to use the forum as a platform to 
promote views that may not be widely shared.  This could put a party in the awkward 
position of having to act against the feedback it solicited. 
Should a party decide to implement the project through a format supporting a 
public dialogue, it will be necessary to provide a welcoming environment for participants.  
Without that, many reasonable participants will leave while the remainder will attract 
participants that are more negative.   
Governing parties could choose to implement an engagement project through the 
civil service, but this is not a good approach.  Doing so would make it easier to 
Figure 9 - Supply chain effects of hosting an OPPEP 
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implement changes and respond to questions but it would also leave the party open to 
key risks.  Most importantly, implementing this approach would hand over a fully 
functioning project team and a network of engaged participants to a new government, 
should a new party come to power.  This would hand advantages to a rival, making it 
more difficult to win back the right to form government in a subsequent election.  In 
addition, publicly funded OPPEPs could not be used to recruit party volunteers.  
Therefore, parties should implement their own projects.   
Using the right tool for the project is important.  “Just because Twitter is the 
latest, greatest, hyped-up thing on CNN [does not] mean everyone should be [on it]” 
(Evans, 2010, p. 88).  Not every tool would make a good host for the project, no matter 
how popular it is.  It is important to select tools that the target audience uses but that are 
also capable of achieving the objectives of the organizers. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss the key risks and their mitigation strategies.  
This will allow me to present a design for the project and a final recommendation for any 
political party wishing to undertake an OPPEP. 
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4: Risk Mitigation Strategies 
This chapter will identify key OPPEP risks and describe mitigation strategies.  
The OPPEP’s design, which I will discuss further in chapter 5, should address the 
potential risks identified in this chapter in order to prevent problems from reducing the 
benefits achieved.   
Key risks include the possibility that rivals may hi-jack the channel, that 
participants may not understand the issues well enough to provide useful feedback and 
that a few “bad apples” might insult and drive away other consultees.  It would not be 
desirable if participants only represent a subset of the province or the target audience.  It 
is also possible that questions posed by the party on the OPPEP could generate more 
feedback than the party has resources to analyse. 
Each of these challenges could negatively affect an OPPEP, if not mitigated.  
The following table briefly describes project risks.  I will elaborate on the key risks in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. 
Table 12 - Summary of risk mitigation strategies 
Risk: Potential Mitigation Strategy(ies): 
Issues not understood by participants. (1) Educate participants through backgrounders. 
(2) Limit the range of topics addressed. 
The public is sceptical following well publicized 
efforts like the Conversation on Health. 
(1) Demonstrate that feedback is taken seriously through action. 
Framing induces bias or undesirable results. (1) Managers must understand the impact of framing to prevent bias. 
OPPEP generates more feedback than can be 
processed 
(1) Hire more staff. 
(2) Reduce the rate of consultations. 
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Table 12 - Summary of risk mitigation strategies 
Risk: Potential Mitigation Strategy(ies): 
The party must disregard popular but 
unworkable views and appear undemocratic. 
(1) Do not display feedback. 
(2) Limit the forum to invited participants. 
(3) Carefully explain decisions to the community. 
(4) Select topics to avoid this position. 
(5) Ask open queries rather than yes/no questions (eg – “What could we 
do to reduce drunk driving?” vs. “Should we increase the carbon tax?”). 
Participants generally favour increased 
spending proposals to fiscal restraint. 
(1) Attract fiscal conservatives to the OPPEP. 
(2) Be as open as possible about public finances. 
(3) Use open queries that can be resolved with money. 
(4) Don’t ask questions unless the party is prepared to loosen the purse 
strings to solve the problem 
(5) Do not display feedback or limit participation to invited participants. 
Aggressive/abusive participants (this is only a 
risk for forums that post user responses). 
 
(1) Establish a code of conduct and encourage the community to self-
enforce the code. 
(2) Moderate posts if necessary. 
(3) Limit participation to invited people. 
The project does not generate enough value to 
justify the cost and must be shut down. 
(1) Address the other risk factors. 
(2) Slow down the rate of consultations to reduce resource requirements. 
(3) Stop asking questions and shift to an “Open Platform” approach.   
People will because upset when some matters 
cannot be consulted on. 
(1) Be open and explain the reason not to consult on that topic. 
Misinformation is brought into the discussion 
(This is only a risk on forums that post user 
responses). 
(1) Monitor and quickly respond to misinformation. 
(2) Community members may post corrections too. 
Losing an election means losing control of the 
portal (This is only a risk if the channel is run by 
GCPE). 
(1) This risk could be dealt with by using a channel owned by the party, 
caucus or individual MLAs.  However, professional public servants 
cannot staff the channel in each of these cases making it more difficult 
to identify and correct misinformation. 
Time is wasted dealing with rivals’ supporters. (1) Most rivals’ supporters will get bored after a while.  Not many people 
want to waste a lot of time getting little reaction. 
(2) Learn to identify the complainers.  If someone always complains, 
simply be polite and thank them for feedback but do not engage. 
  
   57 
4.1 Key Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Not every risk is as likely to arise, nor do they all share the same potential 
impacts.  Organizers must address the most important risks within the project’s design.  
The more complicated risks and associated mitigation strategies are discussed in further 
detail below.   
4.1.1 Issues Are Not Well Understood by Participants 
The OECD (2003) identified this challenge with e-Democracy.  Many policy ideas 
are complex and potential solutions have wide-ranging ramifications that participants 
may not understand.  Participants may be upset if leaders do not implement their ideas 
and as a result may stop supporting the party.  After all, “engaging citizens online raises 
legitimate expectations that public input will be used to inform policy-making” (OECD, 
2003, p. 18). 
Organizers can mitigate this issue by creating backgrounders.  Many consultees 
will not review encyclopaedia-sized documents limiting the potential size of 
backgrounders.  However, some people will be interested in receiving some information 
on the topic.  A high-level overview could inform potential participants, while links could 
direct interested readers on to more detail. 
It will be important to ensure that poorly researched backgrounders do not 
become an issue.  Fortunately, a party with a large base of public support will have 
access to many experts who can vet backgrounders.  However, even well researched 
backgrounders could become controversial.  If this happens, simply thank participants 
who point out real or perceived errors and note that one goal of the OPPEP is to uncover 
the facts surrounding the problem and correct any problems with the backgrounder. 
Another strategy is to limit the range of topics that the party brings into the 
OPPEP.  Parties should not use the project to explore complicated policy questions 
requiring a deep level of subject matter expertise in order to understand them. 
4.1.2 Framing Questions 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that framing questions affects the 
answers received.  Framing can encourage risk aversion or loss aversion.  It will be 
important to understand common biases when drafting questions.  The decision makers 
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who approve the final wording will also need to be aware of the impact of framing.  
Similarly, choosing closed or open questions will affect the results of the consultation.   
Closed questions will get yes/no responses and set the wrong frame for creative 
problem solving.  Responders may shy away from difficult trade-offs and may generally 
favour increased spending on the program in question.  This would reduce the quality of 
feedback received. 
Open questions on the other hand invite creativity.  This will provide decision 
makers with more options to consider and is more likely to generate startling new ideas 
for consideration. 
Managers must prevent framing from unintentionally biasing the results. 
4.1.3 Aggressive and Abusive Participants 
Negative participation is only a problem if the party chooses to post feedback.  
Abusive participants can drive away other contributors who would shy away from a 
negative environment.  Choosing a forum such as Facebook, where participants use 
their own names, would reduce this risk.  Most participants would not want friends or 
family to see them misbehave and may moderate their comments accordingly.  
Alternatively, a moderated blog could prevent this problem.   
Limiting participation to invited participants can solve the issue, but this reduces 
the impact of the project, and the potential to attract new members. 
Lastly, organizations can avoid this problem altogether by not posting responses. 
4.1.4 The Project Fails to Deliver More Value than it Costs. 
As will be shown in the appendix, OPPEPs are not free.  This investment must 
create value.  There is the possibility of many responses being misinformed or 
unreasonable.  If parties have to disregard feedback, voters could gather the impression 
that “this party does not care about public opinion.”  It is also possible that the project will 
fail to attract new supporters, or to increase the commitment of existing members.   
The party must give managers time to attract participants.  This is not easy, as 
noted by Macnamara et al. (2010, p. 233) who stated that “the UK central government 
offered £20,000 in prizes in its ‘Show us the way’ consultation project based on earlier 
experiences in which relatively low levels of participation were achieved.”  Work will be 
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required to promote the project since “many efforts fail to attract widespread interest 
among citizens” (Saebo et al., p. 404).  Demonstrating that the party acts on the 
feedback will help to attract and retain participants. 
Addressing the other risks will also help to prevent this challenge from arising, 
but risk mitigation may not be enough.  If the project generates insufficient value after 
addressing the problems, then reducing the rate of consultations would limit the 
resources required to operate the project.   
Lastly, if the project’s resource requirements place too much strain on overall 
party resources, the solution may lie in reducing the number of questions asked on the 
OPPEP, or even stopping them altogether.  Instead, parties could invite random 
feedback through an open platform project.  The challenge with moving to this approach 
is that it requires a personal response to each participant.15  However, it will reduce the 
flow of input and limit the resources required, while still being open to public suggestions 
and feedback. 
4.2 Final Thoughts on Risk Mitigation 
Ultimately, no one can foresee all of the risks associated with the project.  Social 
media is an ever-changing set of tools and people use these programs in different ways 
to interact with each other.  Therefore, risk management will always be a work in 
progress.   
Proper design at the outset will limit problems, but managers must regularly 
review risk mitigation strategies.  Once implemented, the participants and party will 
together define a culture for the project that will influence the nature and types of risks 
posed by the project.  This culture will shift over time.  Therefore, management will need 
to keep an eye on these changes and occasionally update risk mitigation strategies. 
In particular, managers will need to pay close attention to educating participants 
to make the feedback more valuable and to framing questions so that they are not 
biased.  Parties will also need to budget for the amount of participation they receive.  
The OECD (2003) noted that participants have legitimate expectations that their 
responses will help to guide the final decision. 
The next chapter will keep these risks and mitigation strategies in mind as it 
                                                     
15
 A form letter may suffice when all participants are engaged on the same topic. 
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designs a process and looks to take advantage of project data to accrue additional 
benefits. 
   61 
5: Implementation  
Leaders must assign responsibility for project components and managers must 
update work processes to support an OPPEP if it is to succeed.  Managers must assign 
staff to work on the project and the frequency of consultations must be determined.  This 
chapter will explore these issues. 
5.1 Benefits Dependency Network 
A wide range of activities must be coordinated, if the project is to succeed.  
Project managers could execute their roles flawlessly but the project could still fail if 
politicians do not meaningfully act on responses.  Party leaders could implement 
meaningful policy changes to address the points made by participants, but these 
changes will have little impact if the consultations are too infrequent to keep citizens 
engaged.  
All too often, organizations fail to reap the expected benefits from projects.  Often 
this is because business units do not adapt processes to support the effort.  Without 
updating operations to support the new project, the effort may be wasted. 
The work of Peppard, Ward and Daniel (2007) shows a way to deal with 
interdependencies between technology, processes and benefits through the Benefits 
Dependency Network (BDN).  The BDN maps out the relationships between IT tools, 
business processes and benefits.  Once mapped, organizers can assign responsibility 
for each element to key managers who will be accountable for their portion of the project.   
Please see Figure 11 on the following page for a sample BDN.  Parties must 
assign each responsibility to a manager to ensure the project’s success.  Without a focal 
party, I can only assign generic positions that may or may not exist within an 
organization.  Even if these positions exist within a party, specific employees may not 
have the time, experience or authority required to carry out these responsibilities, in 
which case managers must assign the responsibilities to someone else. 
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5.2 Process 
As with any undertaking, the project will be more successful if there is a clear 
process to follow.  This will ensure that employees understand their responsibilities.  The 
process will allow managers to develop a checklist to monitor performance and to ensure 
that work is completed. 
I have designed the process in Table 13, located on page 64, which shows the 
step-by-step process that this paper proposes for running each engagement, based on 
the traditional government consultation process as described to me by Susan Kennedy 
(2011) who oversaw the B.C. Government’s full day kindergarten consultation.  The 
steps of planning a traditional consultation may include: 
1. Define your goal.  Do you want to get policy advice?  Alternatively, do 
you want your partners to help promote a new initiative?   
2. Scan the environment to determine if there are stakeholders that 
Figure 10 - Public policy engagement project sample BDN 
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managers should engage. Speak with experts or stakeholder groups 
that have relevant knowledge.  
3. Determine how stakeholders expect you to interact with them. 
Meetings?  Telephone?  Email?  There is a range of options.  Organizers 
must respect stakeholder’s expectations of the consultation format.   
4. Determine how you will measure feedback. Are you looking for ideas or 
a straw poll?  This will determine how you frame the questions. 
5. Prepare any background materials you wish stakeholders to review. 
6. Draft questions. 
7. Present questions and backgrounders to stakeholders. 
8. Collate and tabulate feedback for consideration by decision makers. 
9. Make and implement policy decisions. 
 
Traditional consultations are similar in format to what I propose for an OPPEP, 
which is described in Table 13, on page 68, so they provide a working structure.  
However, I have made some adjustments to reflect the fact that a party, as opposed to 
civil servants, would run the project and to reflect the fact that that this would be an 
online project.  The appendix provides cost and resource assumptions for each step 
under each option. 
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Table 13 - OPPEP process 
Step Details 
Brainstorm engagement topics.  Add this item to regular staff meetings.  The communications 
director would select the best topics.   
Determine if the question requires consultation with 
stakeholders.  If yes, either conduct that consultation 
before the engagement or halt the process for this 
question. 
 The communications director should be responsible for this step.  
They should talk with an MLA who has subject matter 
experience to answer this question.  Failing to do so could 
offend important stakeholders.  Further, it may be a good idea to 
accept their feedback in the form that they deem appropriate, 
whether that is online, or in a meeting with party leadership.   
Develop a discussion paper to help participants to 
get up to speed before providing feedback. 
 This backgrounder does not have to be very extensive, but 
providing some research will inform responses.   
Obtain expert feedback on the backgrounder.  Expert feedback will help to identify and prevent mistakes or 
omissions in the background information. 
Determine how you will measure feedback.16  It is important to determine how the party will measure feedback 
to help frame the question.  Eg – Prepare yes/no questions for 
yes/no measurements.   
Draft engaging question.  It should take little time to write questions once research is 
complete.  Framing is critical as discussed in section 4.1.3.  The 
minister or critic must approve the question. 
Post question to website.  Notify Twitter and 
Facebook followers. 
 Sending a link to the question to social media followers may 
increase the number of responses received. 
Monitor engagement (only necessary if organizers 
display the feedback provided). 
 Moderators should review feedback throughout the day if parties 
publish responses to correct errors and moderate posts. 
Post message from the minister or critic responsible 
to close the discussion. 
 The response should repeat key themes heard and commit to 
providing a fuller response later.  
 Organizers may wish to experiment with personal notes from 
party staff or the constituent’s MLA.  These messages may have 
the effect of earning more permission to market to the 
constituent.  This could increase their attention to the party and 
the likelihood they become more involved. 
Collate and tabulate feedback.  Research the 
options presented and prepare recommendations 
and alternatives for the minister or critic to consider. 
 This step includes recording any data needed to build a profile 
on each participant that organizers can use to inform recruiting 
efforts. 
Make decision and implement.  The minister or party critic will handle this step so the investment 
will not come from party resources. 
Send a message about what the party accomplished 
to participants. 
 This message should ideally motivate participants to continue to 
take part in the OPPEP. 
 
                                                     
16
 This step precedes writing the question since it should be designed to match the way feedback will be 
measured. 
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5.3 Staffing & Costs 
Project staffing needs will depend on the number of questions asked, the number 
of followers attracted and participation rates.  Please see the appendix for cost models, 
along with the underlying assumptions for each option. 
5.4 Timing 
An OPPEP will not hit full speed overnight.  It will take months to build a network 
of participants and months beyond that for a governing party to implement meaningful 
policy changes based on consultations.  As a result, parties cannot expect the project to 
have an immediate impact and should not wait until a general election to get started. 
Parties wishing to start such a project should aim to have the first consultation at 
least one year before voting day.  However, such a project could conceivably start six 
months before voting day and still have an impact.  If the start is any later, there will be 
no time to build a following.  In this case, it might be better to set up an Open Platform.   
5.5 Topic Selection 
Choosing the right engagement topics will be important.  Topics need to draw 
people in, while recognizing that party supporters often have interests that compete with 
those of the supporters of political rivals.  It is never possible to please everyone in 
politics while also creating a differentiated position that rivals cannot imitate.  If this were 
possible, everyone would adopt the position nullifying the advantage. 
The chosen topics should appeal to supporters.  A major goal is to bring together 
supporters so that the party can win seats.  In votes where only half of eligible voters 
cast a ballot, parties can gain an advantage when they have supporters that are more 
likely to vote. 
Organizers will want supporters to agree with the final position they take on 
issues, otherwise, there is a risk that supporters will become disengaged.  Engagement 
topics should naturally lead supporters to positions that the party will happily adopt.  The 
solutions should create advantage and strengthen the competitive standing of the 
organization.  Figure 11, located on page 66, highlights what might be a party’s goals for 
how each question will influence each voter segment. 
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Figure 11 - Possible project goals for each voter segment 
 
Independent voters should not be alienated in the process.  Otherwise, there is a 
risk they will support rivals.  If possible, questions should encourage independents to 
consider supporting the party.  However, not every question needs to achieve this goal.  
In any event, no question should lead to a conclusion that contradicts current party 
policy, unless organizers intend to reverse that policy position.  Issues polling will inform 
topic selection and framing for each party.  The conclusions will differ for each party.   
As shown in section 2.3, different voters see different policy areas as priorities.  
Some segments vote based primarily on whom they feel is better able to manage the 
economy, while others might vote based on who will best manage health care.  Polling 
can help to identify major themes that organizers should address through consultation. 
Not every topic is good for every party to use in an OPPEP.  As Keller (1998, p. 
107) notes, it is “very difficult to try to create an association that is not consistent with 
existing consumer knowledge” about the brand.  If voters perceive the party to be weak 
on important issues, they are more likely to withdraw their support.  Highlighting the 
issue through consultation can increase the issue’s perceived importance and increase 
the amount of time voters spend thinking about the topic.  Further, improving peoples’ 
perceptions of the party’s strength on an issue that is not relevant to the voting decision 
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does not make a difference.  Not all associations are important (Keller, 1998, p. 108).  
However, “inconsistent associations may cause confusion over meaning and may cause 
less favourable new associations” (Keller, 1998, p. 257). 
For example, it would be unwise of the NDP to consult on matters of criminal 
justice that are top of mind for only 2% of voters.  Further, Angus Reid Public Opinion 
(2012) found that only 1 in 5 British Columbians feels that the NDP is best suited to 
manage the file.  This means that many of the 2 in 5 British Columbians who the survey 
found intend to vote NDP would only be reminded that they perceive the party to be 
weaker than another party on this topic.  Similarly, the BC Liberals should be careful 
about health care topics, a top priority for 17% of voters.  Table 14, located on page 68, 
shows which topics might be good for each of the two major parties.  The 
recommendations are based on data published by Angus Reid Public Opinion (2012). 
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Table 14 - Relative merits of consultation topics by party 
Policy Topic B.C. Liberals NDP 
Crime  This is a good topic if crime becomes an issue, but 
only 3% of voters place it as their top priority. 
 This is a poor topic since the NDP 
are traditionally perceived to be 
weak on crime. 
Health  This is an important issue.  However, highlighting 
health topics will soften support since the NDP 
looks better on this file. 
 One way to consult on this topic is to bring forward 
new ideas that the public will support but the NDP 
cannot due union interests.  Such topics include 
private involvement in the health system. 
 This is a great issue for NDP to 
use.  
 Given the NDP’s worldview, it 
should attack any perceived 
attempt by the liberals (or others) 
to increase private health care 
services. 
Economy  This is a great issue for the liberals.  Voters have 
traditionally perceived them to be better managers 
and it is prominent in many voters’ minds. 
 This issue is top of mind for 27% of voters.   
 Attack liberal fumbles, but 
otherwise steer clear. 
Environment  The liberals trail slightly, but as the carbon tax 
showed, environmental issues can be used weaken 
support for the NDP in the environmental 
movement.   
 Should not be too prominent since few voter say 
this is their top priority. 
 The NDP will need to be careful 
due to their opposition to the 
Carbon Tax.  However, there is a 
natural affinity between 
environmentalists and the social 
justice platform of the NDP. 
Education  Only 5% of voters say this is their top priority.  
However, education may become more important 
as the economy improves and becomes less or a 
voter priority. 
 Questions should explore choice in learning topics 
that the NDP cannot pursuit because union allies 
oppose these ideas. 
 Only 5% of voters presently this is 
their top priority.  However, the 
issue may become more 
important once the economy 
improves. 
 The NDP should attack 
personalized learning and focus 
on uniform solutions. 
 
 
These issues can become more or less important to voters over time, as shown 
in Figure 12, located on page 69.  These shifts will affect the value of consulting on each 
topic.  In addition, the perceived strengths of each party on these issues will change from 
time to time.  Organizers must consider these changes when developing their topic 
selection strategies. 
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. 
Managers should also look to see which topics interest young voters.  Shachar 
(2003) noted that a voter’s first choice tends to be enduring between elections, so 
catching young voters is important.  These voters are likely to have different priorities 
compared to other segments, such as senior citizens approaching retirement. 
It is not enough to consult on the right subjects, parties must also play to their 
strengths within these topics.  The major parties often find themselves differentiating 
themselves based on the worldviews identified by Wexler (2005).  This allows parties to 
promote unified platforms appealing to a large segment of the population, with policies 
that do not contradict other policies in the platform. 
The parties seem to divide themselves on the Wexler wheel between the 
Communitarian, Entrepreneurial and Regulatory views as described by Wexler (2005).  
This division is shown in Figure 13, and is discussed in further detail in section 2.4.  
Parties do not exclusively represent one dominant worldview.  For example, the NDP 
has an affiliation with communitarians through social justice issues.   The BC 
Conservative’s platform appears to straddle both the regulatory and entrepreneurial 
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Figure 12 - Shifting importance of selected issues, adapted from Mustel Group (2011) 
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views.  This is not surprising since that party’s leader has voted NDP in recent elections 
(Freeman, 2012).  Its core principles support free enterpise competition, but also 
increasing environmental and natural resource protection which typically means 
increased regulation (BC Conservative Party, n.d.). 
 
 
These worldviews highlight how organizers should frame questions.  The B.C. 
Liberals should pose questions that appeal to freedom, competition and limited 
regulation while the NDP should focus on uniform solutions.  For example, the Liberals 
might look to improve schools by offering more choice in education and letting the 
various types of schools compete for students.  The NDP might look to a uniform 
solution where every child is educated in the same type of classroom.  Framing 
questions will be important to draw out these differences, so that the topics and answers 
appeal to both potential and current party supporters.  In addition, framing would 
highlight the positives about the party’s worldview and may convince independents to 
become supportive.  Section 4.1.2 provides additional information on framing. 
5.6 Participation Incentives 
As noted by Harfoush in “Yes We Did”, keeping people involved will be important 
for project success (Harfoush, 2009).  One way to achieve this will be to offer small 
rewards to keep participants interested.  These rewards should be appealing and ideally 
Figure 13 - Worldviews represented by B.C.’s parties on Wexler's map 
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draw participants closer into the party fold.  Organizers could distribute prizes through 
contests or random draws as a reward for participation.  These rewards will keep some 
people motivated to stay involved with the project. 
Potential rewards might include a phone call from the party leader, free tickets to 
a fundraising dinner, invitations to receptions or coffee parties to meet the premier or 
other party leaders.  The rewards do not have to be expensive; they merely need to be 
special enough to keep participants involved.  Rewards should also incentivize 
participants to engage in other offline activities that create value for the party. 
5.7 Harvesting Additional Benefits 
OPPEP participants provide a potential network of volunteers that parties can 
use to support campaign efforts and thereby increase the odds of winning elections, or 
at least of retaining opposition status.  While a complete discussion of how to implement 
these next steps is beyond the scope of this paper, I will briefly touch on them so that 
managers can think about how they might accrue these benefits. 
Participants will be handing a wealth of personal information over to the project 
team.  Responders will reveal what issues are important to them.  This will allow 
organizers to personalize marketing efforts to suit each participant, potentially increasing 
the likelihood that the marketing strategy will achieve its goal.  People who are interested 
in a specific topic should get information about the party’s promises on that topic rather 
than generic messaging.  Therefore, parties should plan to codify participants into 
groups and gather their contact information for use during the election campaign. 
Organizers can also ask participants to become volunteers.  It may be inferred 
from the fact that the participants have provided comments that they must be interested 
in politics.  Asking OPPEP participants to volunteer for quick jobs is likely to succeed in 
converting online support into offline action.  However, this will mean that the party will 
need to keep track of participants.   
Readers wishing to gain further insight into how parties can use the relationships 
built by OPPEPs for direct marketing efforts should read Harfoush’s 2009 book “Yes We 
Did” about her work on the Obama campaign. 
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5.8 Measuring Success 
Given the project cost, it will be important to deliver value for the investment.  
Belch et al. (2005) note that it is good to measure results against objectives.  It will be 
important to determine which objectives parties should use.  Public opinion polls are not 
appropriate, since polls may shift for reasons unrelated to the project.   
While it is important to measure the number of participants that are attracted to 
the project, numbers alone are not sufficient to determine the project’s success.  For 
instance, attracting participants who will never support the party does not achieve 
organizational objectives.  Alternatively, attracting people who already contribute to 
policy development through party conventions does not move the party closer to its 
goals.  Lastly, it is unlikely that more than ten or twenty thousand British Columbians will 
become frequent OPPEP participants, in which case the goal might be to attract 
volunteers who will convince others to vote for the party.  Therefore, parties should seek 
other measures in addition to the number of participants taking part in the OPPEP. 
Harfoush (2009) noted that online activity is good when it leads to offline support.  
Good measures of the benefits would include the number of new members who sign up 
through the project and the number who become volunteers or attend events.   
As discussed in section 2.3, more than 75% of the population appears to be 
aware of the B.C. political brands.  Therefore, goals aimed at increasing brand 
awareness seem to be inappropriate.  Keller (1998) suggests that it is important to raise 
the perceived benefits provided by the brand when awareness is high.   
If successful, the project will affect the tone and volume of online conversations 
about the party and its policies.  As noted earlier, these conversations provide word of 
mouth recommendations that help to form brand attitudes.  Parties that currently use 
social media should already be measuring the effectiveness of their investments.  
Phillips (2001) noted that, even ten years ago, entities could use neural nets and data 
mining to determine the efficacy of PR.   
Sophisticated buzz monitoring tools to measure the volume and tone of internet 
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conversations are available to parties (Evans, 2010).17  Parties should track how volume 
and tone change during the implementation of the OPPEP to measure success, since 
they reflect how brand attitudes are changing.  Unfortunately, public attitudes might be 
changing due to other, non-OPPEP factors, so analysts must take care when interpreting 
this data. 
5.9 Final Thoughts on Implementation 
The first step in the process will be to identify the technologies and business 
process changes required to implement the project.  Organizers must clearly assign 
responsibility to individual managers for each change.  Individual parties will make 
different implementation choices and will have different business structures, and this will 
affect how managers link and assign these responsibilities within a BDN. 
Running an OPPEP would not be cheap.  Parties must budget for the expense 
and must aim to staff the OPPEP appropriately.  Analysing feedback will take time, but is 
necessary to make the project meaningful.  The OPPEP must be genuine, or participants 
may disengage.  Participants who feel the party was not serious when it asked for their 
feedback may come to distrust the party and its motivations. 
Topic selection is not a trivial matter.  Some topics are better suited to the project 
and to individual parties.  Organizers must apply a strategic lens to this activity.  Interns 
should not be responsible for selecting topics, since parties must choose these topics to 
achieve strategic marketing and communication objectives.  Organizers should avoid the 
issue of the day if the public perceives the party to be weak on the subject.  This would 
highlight the weakness and may prod participants to rethink their support of the party. 
It is not enough to start the project and hope that it succeeds.  Managers should 
measure success and failure in order to determine the value generated by the project 
and to make improvements to the format.  Some good measures include how many new 
members join because of participating in the project and how the project affects the tone 
of online discussions about the party. 
                                                     
17
 Evans also noted the importance of ensuring the monitoring tool’s dictionary assigned the right meaning 
to words.  A word that is neutral in one context may be positive or negative in another.  For example, 
loyalty is perceived by many to be a good quality.  However, an MLA said to be putting party loyalty of 
the interests of constituents may not be highly regarded.  Complicating matters is that fact that a party 
might wish to be seen as standing up to a group or demographic.  This would make posts emanating 
from that group appear negative despite the fact they are intended.  However, some measures should be 
in place given the size of investment. 
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Once running, an OPPEP is likely to provide a source of new members, 
volunteers and even donors.  However, organizers will need to reach out and ask 
participants to join the party, volunteer for events and even donate money. 
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6: Recommendation 
As we have seen, OPPEPs provide parties with an opportunity to engage 
members of the public in policy development.  Engaging citizens in the process may 
create a network of informed people and improve the public’s understanding of the 
issues involved in policy development.  In addition, people who have had a role in 
developing a policy are more likely to support the outcome.  Participants are more likely 
to become ambassadors for the policies, and to encourage other people to support the 
outcome.  Participants are also a potential source of volunteers.  This means that parties 
who undertake an OPPEP will potentially have more people to carry out the multitude of 
tasks that lead to winning seats during elections. 
Public engagement through online media is not free.  Parties must either hire 
staff to implement the project or else free up the workload of existing employees so that 
they can carry out this work.  Participants might disengage if nothing meaningful comes 
of their participation.  These problems mean that parties cannot afford to implement the 
project poorly.  Project staff must receive training for their new duties, including studies 
of bias and framing. 
Implementing a public policy engagement project requires the creation of a 
complex network of IT and business process changes in order to generate the desired 
benefits.  Creating a BDN and assigning managers to be responsible for each node 
would mitigate the risk that the complexity involved would jeopardise the project. 
Despite all of the challenges and the significant effort required to implement the 
project, substantial rewards await parties that choose to engage with the public in this 
way.  It will strengthen their appeal to voters, increase the number of volunteers 
dedicated to their team, make it less likely that their supporters will defect to other parties 
and, ultimately, make it more likely that they will win and retain the right to form 
government.  In short, the project will reduce the influence of rivalry in this industry and 
help parties compete from differentiated positions.  This will also raise entry barriers for 
new parties, since they will not be able to build meaningful projects; after all, how many 
people will be willing to dedicate time to a project that will have no impact? 
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Appendix – Detailed Costing of OPPEP Options and Agency Budgets 
This appendix will look at the detailed cost model that I have prepared for the 
project in order to determine the expected project budget.  I will start by providing 
resource assumptions for each step and then cost out the process for each option.  
Once I have estimated staffing costs, I will perform a sensitivity analysis on the 
recommended option to highlight which steps must be accurately estimated when 
planning the budget.  The project will not hit full steam overnight.  Therefore, I will 
provide monthly budget estimates at quarterly intervals for the start-up period and 
discuss the sensitivity of the estimates. 
These operating costs must yield a benefit.  Therefore, I will perform a benefits 
analysis after looking at the costs. 
Cost Model, Assumptions and Sensitivity Analysis 
The primary cost driver of the OPPEP will be the staff time required to monitor 
the site and follow up on engagements.  Costs will vary depending on the type of project, 
the frequency of consultations and popularity of the OPPEP.   
I have assumed that parties that do not share feedback will receive 10,000 
participants (that is, observers, since not everyone will respond to each post).  I based 
this on the observation that nearly as many people responded to a recent consultation 
hosted by the BC Legislature (2012) on a very hot topic (cosmetic pesticide use).  I have 
also considered the Facebook pages of politicians with the largest followings, such as 
Christy Clark who recently surpassed 8,000 fans.  I have also assumed that as the 
dialogue will engage participants it is likely to attract twice as many followers. 
While the site will have many followers, not everyone will respond to each 
question.  Observation of BC Liberal policy sessions shows that each topic engages 
some people and bores others.  There is no reason to suspect that online engagement 
will be different.  I have based the response rates on observation of MLA John Rustad’s 
Facebook account, which is the closest facsimile I have found to the project in B.C.  
Seldom do his 4,400 followers provide more than 70 responses to any of his questions.  
The sample average was 42 or 1%.  Political parties are likely to achieve a higher 
response rate because they corporately have more power to effect change and therefore 
the accomplishment will be more visible.  This lines up with research cited by Saebo et 
al. (2010) stating that “Janssen and Kies (2005) argue that citizens’ will to participate is 
dependent on assumed political impact.”  While I cannot measure the difference in 
perceived impact of the two, I have conservatively assumed a 5% response rate for each 
question on an open forum that is hosted by a party.   
In developing these models, I have assumed that sites with published feedback 
will receive 2.5 times as many responses.  I based this estimate on observations of 
political dialogues hosted by a B.C. MLA (John Rustad) where the observed samples 
had averages ranging from 1.5 to 4.0 responses per responder with an average of 2.5 
responses per unique responder. 
Most BC Liberal Party conventions attract approximately 1000 members.  Since it 
is easier to participate online, I have assumed that three times as many will join an 
invitation only website and have slightly increased the response rates since invited 
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followers are less likely to observe passively. 
The remaining estimates come from the observations of interviewees performing 
or managing similar work.  Salary and benefits are similar to those doing similar work at 
GCPE and with government caucus and within the liberal party. 
Lastly, the squares shaded in yellow are variable figures that are completely at 
the control of the party.  I have not included the “do nothing” option since the operating 
cost is zero.  I also have excluded the “scan existing sites” option since the costs are 
entirely variable and depend on how many sites are monitored and how frequently. 
I have not included costs to identify and invite participants into closed forums.  
Regional organizers whose jobs are to get more people involved with the party could 
accomplish this.  These invitations do not represent an additional cost because without 
the site, they would look to other ways to get people involved with their party. 
Table 15, located on page 78, displays the resource and cost assumptions used 
to estimate the annual operating cost of each type of OPPEP. 
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Table 15 - Project cost model 
Step  
(time in hours) 
Invitation 
Only With 
Private 
Feedback 
Open site 
With Private 
Feedback 
By 
Invitation 
Only With 
Dialogue 
Open 
Forum With 
Dialogue 
Brainstorm engagement topics 1 1 1 1 
Determine if question requires stakeholder consultation 1 1 1 1 
Develop public discussion paper 14 14 14 14 
Obtain expert feedback on discussion paper 7 7 7 7 
Determine how feedback is measured 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Draft Question 1 1 1 1 
Post Question 0 0 0 0 
Monitor/Moderate feedback (per response) 0 0 0.02 0.02 
Draft and send form response from minister or critic 1 1 1 1 
Analyse feedback (per response) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Give analysis to minister or critic 3 3 3 3 
Make decision and implement (not a party expense) n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Inform participants about the result. 3 3 3 3 
     Assumptions 
    Total # of participants 3000 10000 3000 20,000 
average # of responses per question 100 200 250 1000 
# of questions per year 52 52 52 52 
     Calculations 
    Staff hours required per question 58.5 83.5 101.6 305.7 
Total staff FTE required 1.73 2.47 3.00 9.03 
Salary + benefits per FTE (Average Salary of $67,500 per 
 year) $84,375 $84,375 $84,375 $84,375 
Cost $145,835 $208,157 $253,168 $762,134 
 
As with any estimate, there is a possibility that the assumptions driving the cost 
model are inaccurate.  Therefore, I have conducted the sensitivity analysis shown in 
Table 16, located on page 79, on the chosen option, in order to determine how each 
assumption affects project costs.  I have omitted the number of participants since 
responses, not participants, drive the workload.  I have also left out staff hours required 
per question, total FTE required and the total cost since these are dependent variables. 
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Table 16 - Open site with private feedback sensitivity analysis 
Step 
Annual cost reduction if time 
for this item is reduced by 10% 
Annual cost increase if time for 
this item is increased by 10% 
Brainstorm engagement topics -$249 $249 
Determine if question requires stakeholder 
consultation -$249 $249 
Develop public discussion paper -$3,490 $3,490 
Obtain expert feedback on discussion paper -$1,745 $1,745 
Determine how feedback is measured -$623 $623 
Draft Question -$249 $249 
Post Question $0 $0 
Monitor/Moderate feedback (per response) $0 $0 
Draft and send form response from minister or 
critic -$249 $249 
Analyse feedback (per response) -$12,464 $12,464 
Give analysis to minister or critic -$748 $748 
Make decision and implement (not a party 
expense) n/a n/a 
Inform participants about the result. -$748 $748 
   
Assumptions 
Annual cost reduction if this 
item is reduced by 10% 
Annual cost increase if this item 
is increased by 10% 
Total # of participants n/a  n/a 
average # of responses per question -$12,464 $12,464 
# of questions per year -$20,816 $20,816 
   
Calculations 
Annual cost reduction if this 
item is reduced by 10% 
Annual cost increase if this item 
is increased by 10% 
Salary + benefits per FTE (Average Salary of 
$67,500 per year) -$20,816 $20,816 
 
As shown above, the accuracy of the cost estimates depends most on the 
number of questions per year, the average number of responses and the time it takes to 
analyse feedback.  In the worst-case scenario, where each step takes 10% longer than 
predicted and the average number of responses and salaries are 10% higher, the total 
project cost is $266,000 per year or 28% higher than the base case.  The best-case 
scenario, where each of these items is 10% less than expected, implies a cost reduction 
of 28%. 
An OPPEP will not hit full steam overnight.  It will take time for participants to 
become aware of and attracted to the project.  Word of mouth referrals through the party 
social media accounts will be important to attracting people.  The online following will 
grow until it reaches equilibrium when there are fewer interested people to attract and 
they become harder to find.  This equilibrium will be dynamic as the number of 
potentially interested people changes.  One of my interviewees felt that it would take 2 
years to hit this equilibrium unless heavily advertised.  Not much research appears to be 
available to determine the rate of acquisition of followers.  As such, I will approximate 
growth with a straight line.  This is not perfect, but should be close enough to develop a 
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preliminary budget for the chosen option, open site/private feedback.  This monthly 
budget is: 
 
If it takes 3 years for the project to hit full steam, then these estimates are $3,500 
per month too high in month 24 (although closer in all other months).  If it only takes a 
single year to hit equilibrium, then the estimates in months 1-12 are off by a factor of two.  
Therefore, parties should plan to be ready in case there is a surge in participation. 
Benefits Analysis 
The project’s operating cost would not be cheap for any party and therefore it 
must yield some benefits in return.  As discussed in section 5.8, those benefits might be 
finding and retaining volunteers who will help with the campaign and changing the tone 
of internet conversations.   
Measuring increased donations is somewhat complicated by the fact that parties 
should not include any donations that are cannibalized from traditional fundraising 
efforts.  The party should only consider money received from new donors who participate 
in the OPPEP as a project benefit.  The amount of funds raised should be measured, but 
may be small. 
It will be difficult to ascribe changes in the behaviour of existing members to the 
project.  They may donate more, volunteer more or even be less likely to leave the party.  
Unfortunately, it would be difficult to measure these outcomes. 
One change that would be relatively easy to measure is the number of new 
volunteers that are attracted through the project.  While many of the participants will 
already be party volunteers or even supporters of rivals, some will be non-members that 
can be recruited into the party.  Assuming these new members volunteer for two four-
hour shifts per week during the month long campaign and assuming the contribution is 
valued at $15 per hour (a modest rate for temporary labour), each new volunteer would 
be worth $480 per campaign.  If this were the only project benefit, over 1,700 new 
volunteers would need to be attracted to make the project worthwhile.  This is modest at 
17% of expected participants, but parties cannot take this for granted and must track 
whether participants volunteer.  This measure does not include any hours volunteered 
between elections. 
Changes to the tone of internet conversations should also be measured, but it will 
be difficult to place a dollar value on the results. 
Start-up Costs 
Project start-up costs are highly dependent on the parties’ content management 
service contracts and the format used.  If launched on Facebook, this could be done 
virtually without cost.  An open project with private responses would be more difficult 
since there are few off the shelf tools to implement the project (Pederson, 2012).  One 
should expect start-up costs to total between $15,000 and $40,000 depending on the 
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bells and whistles attached to the project and the time it takes to design and experiment 
with the look and feel (Pederson, 2012).  Organizers thinking about undertaking this 
project should consult with their web content management services to develop cost 
estimates. 
Marketing costs are not included in the estimates above.  Regional organizers 
and MLAs are in a good position to plant the seed early.  They are in regular contact with 
riding leaders and can as part of their day jobs, encourage them to help market the 
project, so there is no incremental cost to promote the project.  
Budgets of Each Potential Managing Agency 
The reader should also note the relative budgets of the agencies that could 
manage the project.  Table 17 below outlines the agencies’ budgets.  Government run 
projects are not available to opposition parties.  Caucuses’ annual funding must cover all 
administrative, research and communications needs.  Therefore, managers cannot direct 
all of a caucus’ annual funding to the project. Organizers likewise cannot direct the entire 
party budget to the project.  Party budgets must cover administration, communication, 
research, and debt repayment while saving some money for the next election.  MLA-run 
projects would not cost money per se, but the trade-off would be that the MLA would 
have less time available for their other priorities. 
Table 17 - Annual budgets of potential managing agencies 
  Government 
Caucus annual funding 
(March 2012) 
Party Fundraising 
(2010) MLA 
BC Liberals Limited to voted appropriation. $3.05 million $9.6 million * 
BC NDP Not available for this party. $3.16 million $4 million * 
BC Conservatives Not available for this party. - $61,000 * 
Green Party Not available for this party. - $139,000 * 
 
One thing to note from the chart above is that the open input/published feedback 
option is really only practical for government.  The Liberals could possibly set up a party 
run project in this format, but this would be a significant portion of that party’s budget.  
The next observation is that project costs are out of the reach of the Green Party and the 
Conservatives.  These parties would have to rely on volunteer-run efforts.  The data for 
Table 17 come from Metrics EFG (2008), BC Liberals (2011, b), BC NDP (2011), BC 
Conservatives (2011) and BC Green Party (2011). 
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